Markarian, Defense Attaché in Pentagon; US-Azeri consultations; Gul renominated

This was originally published in August 18, 2007 Armenian Reporter.

From Washington, in brief
by Emil Sanamyan

More than 400 believed killed in attack on Iraqi Yezidis

Four trucks packed with explosives and fuel detonated in a Yezidi-populated area in northern Iraq on August 15, killing at least 400 people and wounding hundreds more. The
Sinjar district where the attack occurred is 75 miles west of Mosul, the area that is home to most of the world’s half a million Yezidis and a stronghold of Sunni Muslim militants.

While the bulk of the Yezidis reside in northern Iraq, they are also the biggest minority group in Armenia, where most of them fled in the early 20th century due to persecution in Ottoman Turkey. The group, which is considered to be ethnically Kurdish, follows a pre-Muslim faith that is typically described as a mix of Zoroastrianism and Manichean beliefs. Yezidis have been persecuted both under Saddam Hussein and since his overthrow. Last April, gunmen shot 23 Yezidis in Mosul.

The Sinjar district massacre, centered on villages of Kahtaniya, al-Jazeera, and Tal Uzair, became the deadliest single incident since the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. The Guardian newspaper reported that “the Islamic State in Iraq, an al-Qaida front group, warned residents last week that an attack on Yezidis was imminent,” and the U.S. military spokesman in Iraq said he believed the group carried out the attack. According to Kurdish intelligence officials, cited by the newspaper, Sunni extremists have become more active in northern Iraq following the “surge” in U.S. military presence in Baghdad, as well as in Anbar and Diyala provinces to the south of Mosul.

Armenia’s Ambassador, Defense Attaché meet top Pentagon official

Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England met with Armenia’s Ambassador to the U.S. Tatoul Markarian and Defense Attaché Col. Armen Sargsyan on August 14, the Armenian Embassy reported. Secretary England is the second most senior official in the Pentagon hierarchy.

According to the Embassy release, the meeting focused on “bilateral military cooperation and regional security issues.” Since 2002 the U.S. has provided the Armenian army with more than $10 million in aid and the two countries have stepped up security cooperation.

Amb. Markarian also relayed the Armenian government’s gratitude for “organizing the full medical treatment and rehabilitation of Lt. Georgi Nalbandian at Washington’s Walter Reed Army Medical Center.” The Armenian officer was seriously wounded in action last November and was first evacuated to a U.S. military hospital in Germany. Following eight months of treatment and rehabilitation there and at Walter Reed, Capt. Nalbandian just returned to active duty in the Armenian Army.

The Armenian contingent of military engineers, medical and logistics personnel have been in Iraq since January 2005. Armenians are part of the Polish-led Multi-National Division Central South, and they are based near Iraq’s border with Iran.

Foreign Minister Gul to be re-nominated for Turkish presidency

Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) will re-nominate Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul as its candidate for president. The Turkish parliament is set to elect a president in three rounds of voting between August 20 and 28. Mr. Gul’s previous bid for the presidency was blocked by the military and secular nationalist opposition last May, forcing an early general election.

While prime ministers have greater political clout in Turkey (AKP’s Recep Tayyib Erdogan has been in that job since 2003), presidents have key influence onthe judiciary and the military. The opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) leader Deniz Baykal argued that if Mr. Gul is elected, “Turkey’s political balances will change [and it] will be transformed into a country with an overbearing religious and Middle Eastern identity,” the Radikal newspaper reported.

But AKP’s strong electoral performance on July 22 is expected to make Mr. Gul’s election this time around more likely, with smaller opposition groups pledging to participate in the vote and thus securing the required two-thirds quorum.

On August 9, Koksal Toptan, a secular AKP member and former minister in pre-AKP governments, was elected Parliament chairman, the New Anatolian reported. In that vote CHP as well as independent Kurdish parliamentarians voted for the AKP nominee, with opposition coming only from the right-wing National Action Party (MHP).

U.S. continues consultations with Azerbaijan

Assistant Secretary of State Dan Sullivan became the third State Department official of that rank to hold consultations with Azerbaijan so far this month. On August 15 and 16, he discussed economic and security issues with Azerbaijani officials in Baku, according to APA news agency.

Mr. Sullivan, who heads the State Department’s Bureau for Economic, Energy and Business Affairs, co-chairs the U.S.-Azerbaijan Economic Partnership Commission first launched last February in place of the U.S.-Azerbaijan Task Force on Economic Issues, which had not met since 2005.

On August 3 and 4, Assistant Secretaries Barry Lowenkron and Dan Fried, who respectively head the Democracy and European bureaus, together with Azeri Foreign Minister Elmar Mamediyarov held the “third round of their bilateral dialogue on democracy and human rights in Azerbaijan” – first initiated by the U.S. last December. That consultation was held via a video link.

Serbia, Kosovo oppose partition, remain deadlocked on status

Leaders of Serbia and its internationally-administered breakaway province of Kosovo ruled out the region’s division as part of a settlement, international news agencies reported this week. Serbia has proposed granting ethnically Albanian-majority Kosovo a high-level of autonomy within Serbia, but Kosovo insists on independence, a stance also supported by the United States.

In an August 13 interview with the BBC, Amb. Wolfgang Ischinger, the European envoy to the contact “troika” – which also includes U.S. and Russian representatives and coordinates an international effort to reach an agreement between Serbia and Kosovo – said that mediators might support a territorial division of Kosovo along ethnic lines, if the two sides agree to it. “We are urging parties to think outside the box,” he said.

A division that would leave Kosovo’s ethnically Serb-populated northern part within Serbia has been supported by some influential but unofficial circles in Belgrade, but Kosovars have ruled it out. Last month, Kosovo President Fatmir Sejdiu promised to declare independence on November 28, which is also Albania’s independence day.

A United Nations Security Council resolution that would bring Kosovo closer to international recognition was withdrawn by the United States last month, after Russia threatened to veto it. Officials suggested that the U.S. may break the impasse by recognizing Kosovo unilaterally before the end of the year, unless another accommodation is reached through ongoing talks or at the UN.

Serbia’s Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremic was in Washington last month and according to a Scripps Howard July 27 report, he lobbied for the U.S. to drop its support for Kosovo’s independence, or at least to extend the ongoing negotiations beyond this year. But following that visit the State Department spokesman Sean McCormack reiterated, most recently on August 14, that the U.S. continues to support “independence for Kosovo.”

Community challenges ADL’s position on the Genocide

This was originally published in August 18, 2007 Armenian Reporter.
by Emil Sanamyan

Watertown votes to cut ties with Anti-Defamation League; others may follow

WASHINGTON – Following public outcry, the Watertown, Mass. Town council voted unanimously on August 14 to rescind its cooperation with the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) citing its stance on the Armenian Genocide. Other communities around Massachusetts might follow suit in the weeks and months ahead.

The outcry came following public remarks that ADL executive director Abraham Foxman made to the Los Angeles Times last April and again to the Boston Globe last month. Mr. Foxman’s position is one which is viewed as being hypocritical. When asked, Mr. Foxman pleaded ignorance as to whether the Armenian Genocide occurred and argued against congressional consideration of a resolution that would affirm the U.S. record on the issue. It is worth noting that the ADL website lists among other reference works on the Holocaust the 1999 Encyclopedia of Genocide edited by Israel Charny, whose “major sections deal with the Armenian genocide, the Holocaust, and the process, detection, denial and prevention of genocide” (as stated on the web site).

The ADL – first established in 1913 to fight anti-Semitism in America – has since expanded to oppose bigotry and extremism in general, and the denial of past crimes against humanity in particular. Since 1999 it has helped launch the “No Place for Hate” (NPFH) programs in hundreds of communities around the United States – including Watertown. NPFH activists work in cooperation with local governments and community members to promote tolerance. But in the last several weeks, the ADL’s position on the Armenian Genocide came under strong criticism in letters and commentaries in the Watertown Tab, a local newspaper, the Boston Globe, and elsewhere, including Jewish-American publications.

On August 3, the Armenian National Committee (ANC) of Eastern Massachusetts appealed with an open letter to the local NPFH leadership, arguing that its “affiliation
or acquiescence with Mr. Foxman’s unconscionable position on the Armenian Genocide seriously undermines the efforts of NPFH.” Ruth Thomasian, Founder and Executive
Director of the Watertownbased Project SAVE, which works to preserve the photographic record of the Armenian history, has been a member of the local NPFH and took part in its recent deliberations. “I have to say that the 15 members of our NPFH all got it,” Ms. Thomasian told the Armenian Reporter. “We initially proposed to clarify this issue with ADL within 90 days and to try to have them change their position [on the Armenian Genocide], which is completely inappropriate.”

But faced with public outcry, the Watertown town council acted swiftly to rescind the relationship with the ADL-co-sponsored NPFH in a vote on August 16. In response, ADL of New England issued a letter saying it was “saddened” by the decision. It said that “as a result, Watertown will lose a valued resource for your community,” the Boston Globe reported. Ms. Thomasian said, however, that the Watertown NPFH will reconstitute itself under a different name, unaffiliated with ADL, and will continue to promote tolerance. She said she hoped funding would continue to come for the effort from Blue Cross / Blue Shield of Massachusetts, as it has up to this time.

Housed in nearby Brookline, Mass., the Facing History and Ourselves project has worked to advance the study of genocide at schools around the world. Earlier this summer, it helped train 33 educators “to teach their students the history of the Armenian Genocide and the lessons it has for today” in schools around U.S. and Canada, according to its July 12 press release. Asked for comment, its press officer Erica Stern expressed hope that the Watertown decision would “not detract from the significant good work that needs to be done, particularly in education.”

Meantime, the Boston Globe reported that Massachusetts State Representative, Rachel Kaprielian and Watertown Councilor, Marilyn Petitto Devaney pledged to spread the message to other towns around the state, to mobilize opposition against the ADL’s position. Elizabeth Chouldjian, communications director at the Washington-based ANC of America, welcomed the Watertown decision. “It is hypocritical for an organization that fights bigotry to deny a genocide,” Ms. Chouldjian told the Reporter. She said that while the ADL was long suspected of opposing congressional resolutions, Mr. Foxman’s comments to newspapers, that position has become public, sparking outrage. “Armenian-American activists around the country are following this issue closely, and we will see what develops in other communities,” Ms. Chouldjian said when asked if she expected the campaign to expand.

Senior Turkish diplomat in Washington, Kurdistan stand-off

This was originally published in August 11, 2007 Armenian Reporter.

From Washington, in brief
by Emil Sanamyan

Senior Turkish diplomat to visit Washington as Kurdistan stand-off drags on

Turkish Foreign Ministry Undersecretary Ertugrul Apakan will visit the U.S. capital during the week of August 20, the Turkish Daily News reported on August 8. Mr. Apakan is the second most senior official in the ministry after Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul. Mr. Gul himself visited Washington last February to lobby against the congressional resolutions affirming the Armenian Genocide. The Congress will still be in recess, Mr. Apakan may be unable to meet senior lawmakers, the newspaper suggests.

The diplomat is expected to prepare the agenda for visits by Turkish leaders, including Prime Minister Recep Tayyib Erdogan, expected this fall. Mr. Apakan’s talks are also expected to focus on Turkey’s concerns over Iraqi Kurdistan. Turkey has threatened to invade the autonomous Iraqi Kurdistan unless U.S. or local forces take action against anti-Turkey Kurdish rebels referred to as the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). Ankara has for the past several months been building up forces along the border with Iraq, just as PKK attacks deep inside Turkey continued. The U.S. has warned against an invasion, and the State Department this week again urged Turkey to address the issue together with Iraqi authorities. Head of the Iraqi Kurdistan administration Massoud Barzani, however, has so far rejected calls to crack down on fellow Kurds.

Meantime, the Washington Times reported on August 4 that the leader of the PKK’s Iranian Kurdish sister organization Rahman Haj-Ahmadi was visiting D.C. to drum up U.S. support against Tehran. Haj- Ahmadi’s group, Kurdistan Free Life Park (PJAK), and the PKK are neighbors in Iraqi Kurdistan – with both organizations’ camps located on the slopes of Mt. Qandil. Over the past year, Turkey and Iran have cooperated to target the two groups militarily.

Congressional human rights commission focuses on Azerbaijan.

The most recent government crackdown on media in Azerbaijan made it a subject of three congressional hearings in the span of three weeks. The congressional Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (known also as the Helsinki Commission) held two of these discussions on July 23 and again on August 2. (See the July 14 Armenian Reporter to read about the first of the three.) In a hearing dedicated to human rights violations in Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Turkey, the Helsinki Commission chair Alcee Hastings (D-Fla.) called developments in Azerbaijan “particularly disturbing,” with “journalists in jail and a series of physical attacks and fines on journalists.” Testifying at the August 2 hearing, Paula Schrieferof the Washington-based Freedom House singled out the case of Eynullah Fatullayev, “ceased the publication of Realny Azerbaijan[the newspaper he edited] to secure the release of his kidnapped father.” Mr. Fatullayev was imprisoned on charges of “insulting” Azerbaijani refugees by visiting and writing an article from Karabakh.

In Turkey, Ms. Schriefer noted continued persecutions on “denigrating Turkishness” charges for such offenses “as stating that genocide was committed against Armenians in 1915, discussing the division of Cyprus, or writing critically on the security forces.” Also testifying, Nina Ognianova the Committee to Protect Journalists argued that U.S. “should take a firm stand against the repressive actions” by relevant governments, and that U.S. inaction “sends a dangerous message to the world.”

Interviewed by the Azerbaijani Service of Radio Liberty on August 9, Assistant Secretary of State Dan Fried claimed that the oft-repeated charge that the U.S. overlooks human rights violations in Azerbaijan because of its security and energy interests there “just isn’t true.” Mr. Fried said that the U.S. has continued to raise relevant concerns with Azerbaijani officials, calling such violations a “constant drag” on bilateral relations which, all the same, should not “paralyze” cooperation in other areas. He also blamed individual cases, such as the imprisonment of the government’s media critics, on the absence of relevant institutions rather than on the actions of Azerbaijan’s ruling family.

Incident sparks fresh Russian-Georgian tensions.

A missile that landed without exploding near Georgia’s breakaway region of South Ossetia on August 6 has led to renewed recriminations between Tbilisi and Moscow, a condemnation by Washington, and calls for restraint and investigation from European officials.

Georgian authorities claimed that a Russian jet fired the missile after intruding into Georgian airspace from Russia’s North Caucasus, calling it “undisguised aggression and a gross violation of the sovereignty of the country.” Russian officials denied this, however, and called for a thorough investigation of the incident. They further alleged that a Georgian plane may have been involved.

On August 8, the Reuters news agency cited a Georgian source close to the investigation of the incident as claiming that the missile was not fired, but inadvertently dropped as the jet in question came under fire from the ground, www.Civil.ge reported the same day. According to the same source, the missile was not armed by the pilot and therefore did not explode.

Russian-Georgian relations have been volatile for years, escalating markedly last year after Georgia detained several Russian diplomats on charges of espionage, and Russia retaliated by severing all transport links with Georgia and expelling hundreds of its citizens. The move left Armenia without a ground communication link to Russia, as well.

Last March, Georgia claimed that Russian helicopters attacked its forces in Abkhazia, an incident also denied by Russia. A UN investigation of that incident was inconclusive. Since then tensions have eased somewhat, and the Russian and Georgian presidents were expected to meet later this month to try to patch up relations. Georgian media speculated this week that the missile incident was possibly intended to scuttle that anticipated summit.

At the core of the bilateral tensions is Tbilisi’s effort to regain control over its former provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which have been de-facto separate from Georgia since the early 1990s and have relied on Russia for support. Georgia has in turn sought Western support to constrain Russia.

Studies measure happiness and wealth.

A recent Gallup poll of 130 countries found a correlation between wealth and happiness in most of the world, Economist.com reported on July 12. There were a few exceptions. “Mid-income Costa Ricans and Venezuelans are among the happiest on the planet. Georgians and Armenians, although not terribly poor, are among the glummest,” the newspaper writes.

For the latter two, the trend is regional. The Economist notes that “more than half the 20 countries with the lowest level of satisfaction with health are in the ex-Soviet Union or eastern Europe though in statistical terms they seem relatively well off.”

There are also big differences in attitudes of the elite and general public, as determined by Ipsos and Pew Global Research polling. In Russia, for example, 43 percent of the elite are satisfied with their life, versus just 20 percent of the general public.

A recent study by the Asian Development Bank, meanwhile, identified Armenia as one of the few countries where the income gap between rich and poor is narrowing, the BBC reported on August 8. It is unclear whether that is having any impact on how happy Armenians feel.

Bryza on US-Armenia relations

Matthew Bryza: U.S. ready to help Armenia study new nuclear plant options

This was originally published in August 11, 2007 Armenian Reporter

WASHINGTON – Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Matthew Bryza has been the State Department manager for Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cyprus, Georgia, Greece, and Turkey for the last two years. On August 7, following his weeklong trip to the Caucasus capitals as well as Moscow, he spoke by telephone with our Washington editor Emil Sanamyan.


Reporter : On July 30-31 you were in Yerevan, which was part of a regional trip that also included Tbilisi, Moscow, and Baku. What can you tell us about the issues discussed in Armenia?

Bryza : I traveled there primarily in my capacity as U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State. The idea was to have the opportunity to explore all of the bilateral issues that I don’t ever have enough time to do if I come there just as a Minsk Group co-chair – when obviously all of our time gets chewed up with Minsk Group business [dealing with the Karabakh conflict].
[This time around] I had a chance to talk about the election, moving forward on democracy and democratic reform. I had some great discussions on energy diversification and a possible follow-on on the Metsamor [nuclear power] plant. We talked about general security cooperation between U.S. and Armenia, and I expressed, a couple of times, gratitude for what Armenia has done with us in Iraq, its contribution [there] which really means a lot to us. It means a lot!
Then of course, we spent some time talking about Karabakh as well.

Reporter : The Armenian government has made building a new nuclear power plant to replace Metsamor after its decommissioning a top priority. Most recently on May 30, President Robert Kocharian said that such a project is “justified both in terms of energy security and economically.” This issue has been discussed both with Russia, with which cooperation on this issue is long-standing, and U.S. Does U.S. have a position on this issue and are there any ongoing U.S.-Armenia consultations?

Bryza : Absolutely to all of the above. There are consultations, but they are very preliminary at this point, because the whole process of developing the follow-on investment to replace Metsamor is in its nascent phase. But we have for years encouraged Armenia to close down the reactor at Metsamor and always recognized that there needs to be a replacement.
We would like to do all we can to make sure that it is a safe and economically viable replacement. So we are in early stages of discussions. And much of what we do now focuses on making sure that Metsamor plant is as safe as possible in its remaining life-span. Because it is not going to be just a matter of flipping a switch at which point there would a follow-on power plant.
Also, we would love to continue our work with both Armenia and Georgia on possibility of electricity cooperation, [which could involve] a new nuclear power plant, as well as the current plan for a new 400 kilowatt [transmission] line linking Armenia and Georgia; we are very supportive of that.
Finally, on infrastructure we had an opportunity to talk about strengthening transit and commercial ties between Georgia and Armenia in the area of road building. It would be nice to link up [the Armenian-populated] Akhalkalaki with the Armenian road system.

Reporter : Last June Georgian leaders made public their interest in nuclear energy and Georgia’s Prime Minister Zurab Nogaideli linked that interest to Armenia’s plans for a new plant. Have the relevant parties come together to discuss this issue?

Bryza : That is up to the countries to work out between themselves. And on this trip, I encouraged the Georgian leadership to talk to their friends and counterparts in Armenia to see if the economics wouldn’t make sense for there to be a one shared plant or two plants. The economics might dictate that there is a need for two plants and that there is a way to share electricity generation and exports. That is for them to think through. But we support that and any such cooperation.

Reporter : [A few months ago, the Armenian service of Radio Liberty carried comments by Tom Adams, the State Department coordinator for assistance to former Soviet states, reportedly made in May 2006 that “especially given the geology here, the earthquake zone, it might be better to come up with an alternative to a second nuclear power plant. Right now, we are leaning against that option.”]
In general, does U.S. have any concerns about plans for a new, safe nuclear power plant constructed in Armenia or Georgia for that matter?

Bryza : No. As long as a plant is safe and up fully to international safety standards, then we are happy to help Armenia explore its options to do just that.

Reporter : Prior and during your visit you praised the conduct of Armenia’s parliamentary election held last May as “freest and fairest election in this phase of Armenia’s independence” and they “brought the Armenian electoral process closer to international standards than any previous election.”
You added however that “there is still some room to go” presumably to improve some of the aspects of election-handling. What are these issues and are they being discussed in run-up to presidential elections early next year?

Bryza : At this point, I am not in a position to say which specific priorities there are, because the parliamentary elections just happened in May and presidential elections are ways away. We are just in early phases of coming up with our conclusions as to where the shortcomings may be. And we are doing that in conjunction with OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), because they are the real experts. Over the next few months we will sit down with OSCE and the government of Armenia to see what additional steps are ought to be taken. We anticipate and hope that the Armenian government would do that with us.

Reporter : Staying on the subject of elections, Nagorno Karabakh elected a new president on July 19. Prior to that, on July 13, you along with Russian and French co-chairs issued a statement claiming that that the “presidential elections in Nagorno-Karabakh have already caused an increase in tensions.” Could you elaborate on how elections there cause an “increase in tensions” and have they really?

Bryza : Did we say that? [Pauses.] Well, they do. Because the holding of a presidential election against the backdrop of a claim of the status having been settled could imply that such an action is pre-judging the outcome of negotiations on that very status to be settled in the future. The whole point is we don’t favor any steps that would prejudge negotiations on status.

Reporter : Still, the term “elected representatives” of Nagorno Karabakh had been used in OSCE documents pertaining to the conflict. And people living in Karabakh should be able to exercise self-governance even before their status is settled internationally. You would probably agree that doing so through elections is not a bad thing?

Bryza : I would probably agree that effective self-government based on democratic principles is generally a very good thing. But the Co-chairs’ statement of course speaks for itself in terms of the current context of where the negotiations are.

Reporter : While the Karabakh negotiations process is taking a bit of a break, there are reports of a new resolution being floated by Azerbaijan among other countries at the United Nations’ General Assembly that essentially endorses the Azeri position on Karabakh. This is something that was tried in the past, but a vote was never scheduled. In those past instances, the U.S. did not take a favorable position on bringing this issue to the UN General Assembly. Has anything changed on that?

Bryza : I would say that any country in the world has the right to bring any issue it wishes to the United Nations’ General Assembly. That is the right that every UN member has. So, in principle we do not oppose countries’ inscribing into the agenda discussion of any item.
The real question is whether the United States would support any particular resolution. In the case of Nagorno Karabakh settlement, I can just say, as we stated over and over again, that we believe that the question of status of Nagorno Karabakh needs to be resolved on the basis of a compromise, on the basis of Helsinki principles, United Nations [Security Council] resolutions. So, I can’t pre-judge on what our stance would be on any [UN General Assembly] resolution until we see the way it is actually phrased.

Reporter : The nomination of Amb. Richard Hoagland to be Ambassador to Armenia was withdrawn last week. Can you give us any ideas in terms of a nomination of a new candidacy? Also, the issue of the Armenian Genocide was
central as to how the nomination process evolved in Mr. Hoagland’s case. What can State Department do to make this process a less painful one?

Bryza : This is not our call. From our perspective, Ambassador Hoagland was unfairly maligned. His statements were taken way out of context in a way that was not fair or did not accurately represent his views or the policies of the United States government. So, there is nothing that we can do to change that. It is a question of what people on the outside wish to do.
I can’t comment on the possibility of a new nominee – that is something for the White House to do. But Ambassador Hoagland never denied anything and he was treated deeply unfairly. And it was a real loss for anybody who cares about not only U.S.-Armenia relations, but Armenia itself that an Ambassador of the caliber of Dick Hoagland would not be going to Armenia and the fact that we had such a long gap in having an Ambassador there.

Reporter : On July 23, speaking at the Washington Institute on Near East Policy, you referred to the likelihood of the House Resolution affirming the Armenian Genocide coming to a vote this fall, and said that “we really need something from the Turkish government that… moves towards normalization of relations with Armenia, it is time for that to happen.” We have been here before, with resolutions in Congress causing Turkey to reassess its policy on Armenia, although no major changes have been made so far. Do you see any indication from Turkey that its government may again be thinking of normalization following its reelection last month?

Bryza : It is not appropriate for me to speak on behalf of the Turkish government. I can tell you what the United States does in this regard. And that is we encourage constantly our Turkish allies and friends to reach out to Armenia to move towards normalizing of relations. And those conversations remain intense.
From our view it is really important that in the current climate of Turkish politics, where I would argue that a very successful election just took place. An election that underscores how vibrant and healthy the Turkish democracy is. That there be a move forward, hopefully as soon as possible, in terms of normalizing relations between Turkey and Armenia.

Reporter : With six countries under your belt in addition to conflict management and energy issues, what keeps you up at night these days?

Bryza : We talked about Nagorno Karabakh and there is heck of a lot going on in Georgia. Just today, there was another aerial attack on Georgian territory which we condemned. [See this week’s From Washington, In Brief.] Just working with Georgia to deepen its economic and political reform and help Georgia achieve its own aspirations for NATO membership. That takes a lot of time.
The other burning issue is helping the European Union achieve its own stated objective of diversification of energy supplies. I work on that a heck of a lot. I spend a lot of time of thinking through the proper way to help not only our allies, but ourselves to integrate our Muslim populations into our democratic societies in a way that allows for these Muslim populations to be proudly Muslim and fully American or fully European and that is another burning issue.

Reporter : How exactly are you involved in that last issue?


Bryza : I’d rather not specify exactly what we are doing, but we have outreach programs in our individual embassies, we are trying to empower moderate scholars who share the belief that there is a crucial debate going within the Muslim world about indigenous traditions versus narrower interpretations of Islam that are often extremist and view jihad as an external struggle that involves violence.
We have to work with our partners in the Muslim world who share our view and our desire that the modernizing and broader interpretations of Islam are able to flourish.

Reporter : There was an article in a Turkish newspaper recently suggesting that you are about to become U.S. Ambassador to Cyprus, any truth to that?

Bryza : I am not planning to go to Cyprus. I choose to stay in this
job for at least another year because it really means a lot to me. It is the greatest job in the world. The things I get to do here, the people I get to interact with, the grand strategic thought and tactical limitation – I am not ready to give this up. So, I am staying right here.


Matthew Bryza
Since June 2005 Mr. Bryza has served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, and since June 2006, concurrently as U.S. envoy for Nagorno- Karabakh and co-chair of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group. From 2001 to 2005 he was the National Security Council Director for the Aegean, Caucasus, and Central Asia – a key White House office that coordinates U.S. policy in the region.
Mr. Bryza joined the State Department in 1989, and his assignments since included advisor (1998–99) and then deputy envoy (1999–2001) in the office dealing with Caspian energy development; advisor in the office dealing with U.S. assistance to former Soviet states (1997–98); and postings with U.S. diplomatic missions in Russia and Poland. Mr. Bryza earned his bachelor’s degree from Stanford and Master’s degree from Tufts University. He is fluent in Russian and Polish.

Hoagland's nomination removed

Bush withdraws nominee for ambassador to Armenia

This was originally published in August 11, 2007 Armenian Reporter

by Emil Sanamyan

WASHINGTON – President Bush on August 3 withdrew the nomination of Richard E. Hoagland to be U.S. ambassador to Armenia. The decision was a victory for the Armenian-American lobby, which had opposed the nomination, and for its supporters in the Senate.

Senator Bob Menendez (D-N.J.) placed a hold on the nomination last year, blocking Senate confirmation. After the president resubmitted the nomination to the new Congress in January, Mr. Menendez placed a hold again. Mr. Hoagland was nominated last summer to replace Ambassador John M. Evans, who was forced to leave his post and retire from the Foreign Service over public remarks he made affirming the Armenian Genocide; the remarks reportedly angered Turkey.

[This newspaper had called on Senators to use the confirmation hearing for Mr. Evans’ successor to urge the State Department to explain the circumstances of Mr. Evans’ early recall and to pressure the White House to end its policy of not calling the genocide by its name.]

During the confirmation hearings, Mr. Hoagland went beyond the administration’s usual policy of acknowledging the events of 1915–17 in Asia Minor but withholding judgment on whether they constituted genocide. He tried to make a case that it was not genocide, thus galvanizing the bipartisan opposition of members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to his nomination.

Only after the State Department formally revised the nominee’s remarks did the committee agree to send his nomination to the full Senate. There, however, action was blocked by Mr. Menendez. Several other senators, including the majority leader, have spoken against the nomination.

Mr. Menendez told The Associated Press that the Bush administration did a disservice to the Armenian people and Armenian-Americans when it removed Mr. Evans “simply because he recognized the Armenian genocide.

“It was clear that their nominee to fill his place was controversial,” the senator said. “I hope that our next nominee will bring a different understanding to this issue and foster a productive relationship with our friends in Armenia.”

“We are gratified to see that the administration has finally come to recognize that Dick Hoagland – through his own words and action – disqualified himself as an effective representative of either American values or U.S. interests as U.S. ambassador to
Armenia,” stated Aram Hamparian of the Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA).

“This is a correct, although a long overdue move,” said Ross Vartian of the U.S.-Armenia Public Affairs Committee (USAPAC). “We trust that the administration will take into account the Hoagland nomination process, when a new candidacy is offered for the position of ambassador to Armenia.”

Both the ANCA and USAPAC fought the nomination of Mr. Hoagland, while another advocacy group – the Armenian Assembly of America (AAA) – did not oppose the nomination.

In a statement released last January, the Assembly argued that “it is vitally important that the United States send an ambassador to Armenia” and that “some of the opposition
[to Amb. Hoagland’s nomination] is based on inappropriate grounds.”

Reacting to the withdrawal of the nomination, the Assembly issued this conditional statement: “Should this withdrawal indicate that the next nominee to serve as U.S. Ambassador to Armenia shall properly acknowledge and characterize the Armenian Genocide, then this is a positive development.”

The withdrawal opens the way for a new ambassadorial candidate to be nominated to the Senate. Rudy Perina, a retired ambassador, is on a temporary assignment as chargé d’affaires, directing the U.S. Embassy in Armenia.

Regional media seminar in Nagorno Karabakh

This was originally published in August 4, 2007 Armenian Reporter.

Through a media seminar, regional journalists get their
first-ever glimpse of Nagorno-Karabakh

by Emil Sanamyan

STEPANAKERT, Karabakh – For two weeks this July journalists from throughout the Caucasus were in Nagorno Karabakh for a seminar organized by the Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR), a London-based non-governmental organization.

The formal reason was training – with a special guest lecturer shipped in from Northern Ireland – and the seminar’s more than a dozen participants did go through several grueling days of sessions on subjects like conflict resolution and collaborative writing. They also covered the presidential elections, meeting candidates, officials, voters and touring polling stations around Karabakh.

But the IWPR seminar also provided most of these journalists with a first-ever opportunity to see Karabakh. “There is practically no information about Karabakh in Georgia,” says Dmitry Avaliani, a former IWPR staff member and now editor for 24 Hours, one of the largest Tbilisi dailies. “We recently had a premier of a Georgian-made film Journey to Karabakh, set during the war here [in the early 1990s],” says Mr. Avaliani. “And so my friends were seriously wondering if it was safe for me to come here.”

Salla Nazarenko has since April led the IWPR’s Cross Caucasus Journalism Network – a three-year project funded by the European Commission, through which the seminar was organized, and involving more than fifty journalists from around the Caucasus.

“Nowadays people [in the Caucasus] do not have much of an opportunity to travel in their own region,” says Mrs. Nazarenko, who is originally from Finland and is now based in Tbilisi. “There is a lot of hate speech, a lot of propaganda,” she said. The IWPR is hoping to break those stereotypes through exchanges such that organized in Stepanakert.

Still, there were no Azerbaijani participants. “The official opinion of the Azerbaijani government is that people should not come here,” says Mrs. Nazarenko. “So we did not want to put people at risk of problems back home.”

Genocide resolution at "crunch point," U.S.' Iraq policy

This was originally published in August 4, 2007 Armenian Reporter.

From Washington, in brief
by Emil Sanamyan

Genocide resolution seen approaching “crunch point”

With elections in Turkey wrapping up, the House Resolution on the Armenian Genocide (H. Res. 106) will approach a “crunch point quite soon,” according to Alan Makovsky, a senior staff member on the House Foreign Relations Committee. But he anticipated no action until the August recess was over.

Mr. Makovsky said this in his personal capacity in response to a question from former Congressman and long-time Turkish lobbyist Stephen Solarz during a July 23 discussion at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP), an audio of which is available on its web site.

Prior to his congressional appointment, Mr. Makovsky headed WINEP’s Turkey program and in that capacity he publicly opposed the 2000 House Genocide resolution, according to reports in the Turkish media at the time.

Both Speaker Nancy Pelosi and Democratic Majority leader Steny Hoyer have had a “long-time personal commitment on this issue,” Mr. Makovsky noted, and “if they had their way [H. Res. 106] would pass.” At the same time, the Bush Administration has been intensively lobbying against the measure. The senior congressional official recalled that two types of arguments have been made against the resolution. The first argument is “strategic,” in terms of potential consequences for U.S.-Turkish relations, and, the second one is that of timing linked to elections in Turkey.

“We [the U.S.] don’t want to become a factor in the elections,” Mr. Makovsky said, and “that point resonated with a lot of people [in Congress].” Now that the Turkish electoral process is about to wrap up (the general election was held on July 22 and a parliamentary vote for president is expected in the next several weeks), that second argument is about to become irrelevant.

Also participating in the WINEP discussion, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Matt Bryza thanked Mr. Makovsky for referring to the Administration’s work in opposing the resolution and promised that it “will continue that approach.” Mr. Bryza reiterated the State Department’s position that it “do[es] not deny anything one way or another” but believes that “those horrible events” should be addressed through dialogue between Armenians and Turks. “How do you do that, I don’t know,” he said but added that that is the approach favored by the Administration.

Referring to “somewhat ominous” comments by Mr. Makovsky that “things are going move” on the resolution, Mr. Bryza argued that “we really need something from the Turkish government that… moves towards normalization of relations with Armenia, it is time for that to happen.”

As of this week, 224 of 435 members of Congress have officially endorsed H. Res. 106. Mr. Makovsky said that the fact that more than half of the House members back the measure was “psychologically significant, but in itself does not mean anything operationally.”

Still, former U.S. Ambassador to Turkey Morton Abramowitz said that the resolution was very likely to pass in the House after Congress’ August recess, the Turkish Daily News reported on July 26.

A vote on the resolution depends on a decision by the Democratic leadership of the House of Representatives.

Be watching…

Our readers in the Washington area take note that this Sunday, August 5 at 8 p.m. the local PBS affiliate WETA channel 26 will be re-airing Andrew Goldberg’s film The Armenian Genocide. This documentary first aired on PBS nationally last year, when it received critical acclaim both in the United States and abroad. For more information connect at www.weta.com.

Reputed plans for U.S.-Turkish “secret operation” against Kurds leaked

Speaking at the Washington Institute for the Near East Policy on July 23, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Matt Bryza hinted that in the immediate future the U.S. is likely to take action against anti-Turkey Kurdish groups in northern Iraq. Mr. Bryza agreed with Turkey’s claims that the U.S. has not done enough to clamp down on forces in Iraqi Kurdistan, usually identified as the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), who Ankara has accused of fueling a growing anti-government insurgency within Turkey.

Both the military and the government in Turkey have threatened to invade Iraqi Kurdistan unless the U.S. takes measures of its own. “The attitude has shifted here in
Washington,” Mr. Bryza revealed. “We have to produce concrete results and I’m confident we are going to soon… in the next few weeks or months.”

In his July 30 Washington Post column Bob Novak offered details of one potential such action. According to Novak’s sources, during the previous week Undersecretary of Defense Eric Edelman gave select members of Congress a confidential briefing on plans, in Novak’s words, “for a covert operation of U.S. Special Forces to help the Turks neutralize the PKK. They would behead the guerilla organization by helping Turkey get rid of PKK leaders that they have targeted for years.”

But, according to the Post columnist, the idea was not well received by at least some in Congress. Its opponents believe that any such U.S. action would undermine progress made in Iraqi Kurdistan, the only stable part of the country. Predictably, U.S. and Turkish officials declined to comment on Novak’s claim.

Most commentators suggested that the leak intended to scuttle any such operation. The
Administration-friendly Washington Times, in its editorial on July 31 blasted the unidentified congressional sources that leaked the contents of Mr. Edelman’s briefing. The Times concluded: “now that it has been made public, the operation has been severely compromised – if it hasn’t been forced off the table altogether.”

But mindful of the Administration’s penchant for secrecy and tendency not to share information with Congress, Blake Hounshell, web editor for the Foreign Policy magazine, wondered on his blog if Mr. Edelman’s briefing to Congress was made with an intention for its details to be leaked. “So perhaps the plan was simply being floated in order to buy more time with the Turks, and Congress was used in order to kill it,” Mr.
Hounshell speculated.

Whatever the case may be, senior Turkish officials continue to threaten to invade Iraqi Kurdistan, although Prime Minister Recep Tayyib Erdogan acknowledged earlier this summer (see this page in Jue 16 Reporter) that the Kurdish resistance is based mostly in Turkey rather than in Iraq. Turkey’s real concern appears to be with the existence of a defacto Kurdish state on its border.

A referendum on the status of the Kurdish-populated and oil-rich city of Kirkuk, expected to result in its unification with Iraqi Kurdistan and opposed by Turkey, may yet lead to a fresh escalation in tensions if it takes place as is currently planned before the end of this year.

Think tank study argues for Iraq partition

Frustration over continuing sectarian violence in U.S.-occupied Iraq has sent Washington policy-makers scrambling for policy ideas that could provide for a long-term stability in Iraq. In recent years, a view that Iraq can no longer function as a centralized state has increasingly gained ground.

Last month, a prominent national security scholar and an experienced conflict-management practitioner issued “The Case for Soft Partition of Iraq,” a policy paper in which its authors Michael O’Hanlon and Edward Joseph argue that such an approach “would involve the Iraqis, with the assistance of the international community, dividing their country into three main regions. Each would assume primary responsibility for its own security and governance, as Iraqi Kurdistan already does.”

The paper was published by the Brookings Institution – one of the more respected and less partisan think tanks in Washington – and received considerable attention both in Congress and in the media.

Nonetheless, the plan has also been criticized because it would entail continued U.S. occupation of Iraq at the current levels for at least another two years, as well as major population relocation within Iraq, certain to cause additional humanitarian crises.

U.S. policy initiatives are frequently vetted through think tank studies, although only few of them become blueprints for government action. A policy paper prepared last year by the pro-Administration American Enterprise Institute, which argued for a “surge” in U.S. troop presence in Iraq as a way to contain the sectarian violence in the country, was one such example. The “surge” policy has been in effect from early this year and has received mixed reviews so far.

This September, the U.S. military commander in charge of the plan is expected to report on whether the approach is working and based on the outcome of that report whether it should be modified or abandoned in favor of troop withdrawal. Mr. O’Hanlon, of the partition study has been supportive of the Iraq invasion as well as the most recent “surge” policy, and may expect to have the Administration’s ear.

U.S. to begin major arms infusion into Middle East

Secretaries of State and Defense Condoleezza Rice and Robert Gates this week traveled to the Middle East, bringing along an aid package that includes many billions of dollars worth of U.S. military hardware for its Arab allies like Egypt, Saudi Arabia and smaller Persian Gulf states, as well as Israel. “The United States is determined to assure our allies that we are going to be reliable in helping them to meet their security needs,” Ms. Rice was reported as saying on July 31 by news agencies.

Israel, which is already the biggest recipient of U.S. military assistance to the tune of $2.4 billion a year, is expected to receive $30 billion over ten years (a 25 percent increase from the current level). Arab states are due to jointly get an additional $33 billion over the same period, with aid to Egypt doubled from $1.3 billion a year. The aid, including naval vessels and missile defense systems, is intended to check the perceived increase in Iran’s regional power following the devastation of Iraq and amid Tehran’s continued progress over its nuclear program, in spite of U.S.-championed international sanctions.

The U.S. Congress would need to approve the aid. That, despite some reservations over aiding countries like Saudi Arabia, seems likely since the plan has Israel’s support. As part of its efforts to contain Iran, U.S. also poured arms into Lebanon in the effort to limit the influence of Iran-backed Hezbollah there. The U.S. is also supporting one of the two main factions in Palestine; aiding Azerbaijan through the multi-year $100 million Caspian security program and funding opposition groups within Iran itself.

Iran’s reaction came from its Defense Minister Mostafa Mohammad Najar. “[The U.S.] are engaging in psychological warfare in the region in an effort to save the American military industry,” he was quoted as saying by news agencies. “U.S. plans are designed to create a security belt around Israel,” Mr. Najar said. “We have no problem with neighboring or Muslim countries, and should any of these countries acquire weapons. This would only make the Islamic world more powerful,” he suggested.

Interview: Former New Yorker building his Armenian dream

First published in July 28, 2007 Armenian Reporter



Ashot Poghosian seeks to reshape the market for meat products in Karabakh
A former New Yorker is building his Armenian dream
by Emil Sanamyan

OUTSIDE NORAGYUKH, Karabakh – “Every Armenian must imagine living in the homeland,” exclaims Ashot Poghosian as he showcases the progress that has been made on the sprawling farm ten miles north of Stepanakert that he purchased recently.

Until earlier this year Mr. Poghosian ran a successful construction services company with a $1.5 million annual turnover in Bayside, N.Y. Now he is the owner and chief
executive of Poghosian Gerdastan, a company he is building with pioneering zeal and Western efficiency, and was only eager to describe in minute detail during a visit by the Armenian Reporter on July 23.

Mr. Poghosian is in the process of building one of the largest Armenian producers of meat products, while helping make his home in Armenian Karabakh.

Long journey home

This energetic 53-year-old Yerevan native and father of five is completing an unusually circuitous journey back to the homeland. Having earned an economics degree from Yerevan State University in the 1970s, Mr. Poghosian decided to move to Moscow, he says, to get away from corruption pervading Soviet Armenia.

After working for 14 years in Moscow, dealing with production of everything from shoes to construction materials, Mr. Poghosian immigrated to the United States
just as the Soviet Union unraveled.

“I knew only three words of English at the time,” he recalls. But that did not stop the then 40-year-old from teaching himself the language and qualifying for a real-estate license. “Pretty soon I was selling more homes than my Americanborn colleagues.”

After earning enough start-up capital, Mr. Poghosian launched his own business, which provided services to the New York City Housing Authority. But he was not satisfied with becoming another American success story.

“I always thought about moving back to Armenia. While still living in Moscow I befriended the former senior Soviet diplomat, the now deceased Ashot Melik-Shahnazarov. After Armenia became independent, he moved to Yerevan to help establish the Foreign Ministry.

“And those were the difficult years. He became an inspiration for me,” Mr. Poghosian says.

The first-ever visit to Karabakh for Mr. Poghosian happened just three years ago, when he helped deliver a consignment of computers to be donated to schools here.

“I soon realized, however, that I could have the most direct impact by moving here rather than providing aid from the distance. I realized that I must be and live here and the time to do it was now.”

Building a modern company from the ground up

“So, I began looking for opportunities here. Karabakh has always been primarily agricultural, but it still produces very few food products that could be successfully exported. And although I had no previous farming or agribusiness experience, over the years I have learned the formula for a successful business.”

Three years ago, Mr. Poghosian purchased Sunzhnika – a Soviet-era farm complex surrounded by rolling green hills just off the recently built Stepanakert-Mardakert
highway.

The facility includes sixteen buildings spread over nine hectares of land. It was used to breed pigs and sell pork until state funding dried up in the early 1990s.

“When I first came here, the site was in a dreadful shape with weeds growing around and inside the buildings,” Mr. Poghosian says. He began by hiring several locals to clean up the site and repair the buildings, launching his own roofing metal production in the process.

“We now have 24-hour electricity, natural gas, artesian water, and Internet. All the necessary production equipment we imported from the U.S. and Europe. In addition to 28 local staff, I employed a very experienced engineer with whom I worked in Moscow and a young economist from Yerevan.

“We have construction work left to do, but right now I am focusing on completing my own house since my family is due to move here next month.”

His wife, mother, and two teenage sons are now looking for airplane tickets.

Casting distortions and doubts aside

Mr. Poghosian’s investments so far have amounted to over $1.7 million. While a number of diasporans and non-Armenians have launched successful businesses in Karabakh on this scale or larger, few have moved here permanently so far.

Mr. Poghosian says that among his acquaintances in New York’s Armenian community there was little excitement or even encouragement over his family’s decision to move,
with people referring to others’ failures to adapt in Armenia and particularly wary of his choice to live in Karabakh.

“Information about Karabakh is often distorted by Armenians abroad,” Mr. Poghosian argues with some irritation. “When I was recruiting my chief engineer, a non-Armenian then living in Ukraine, his Karabakh-born acquaintances told him it was dangerous to come here. These people are either out of touch with reality or just feel guilty living away from home.

“Your homeland is like your parents – can you abandon them if they are in need or ailing?”

Doing business in Armenian Karabakh

It is not like Armenia and Karabakh are not facing daunting challenges. “The biggest issue for us is finding qualified hard-working people to hire,” says Mr. Poghosian.

“With war and years of foreign assistance, the pool of people with necessary skills and even the desire to work hard to make a living has shrunk.” Many also prefer well-paid military service to farming.

So Mr. Poghosian is casting a wider net, recruiting workers from around Karabakh.

“Here is a dormitory we are building for workers from more distant villages, so they would not have to come far on workdays.” He describes designs for rooms equipped with
bathrooms, kitchens, and laundry machines.

The current plan is to launch first production by the end of 2007. The products would include hard salami, basturma, and sujukh, as well as canned meats – things that could survive an export trip to stores in Russia and farther away in Europe and the United States.

Launching production would involve placing the equipment in buildings as renovations on them are done by this fall and buying the necessary number of livestock from farmers.

“The equipment we bought can process 20 cows or 40 pigs an hour. With that capacity we could slaughter all the cows in Karabakh in a couple of years,” Mr. Poghosian jokes as he paces around the farm chain-smoking King Arthur cigars.

According to official statistics there are only about 10,000 heads of cattle in Karabakh.

Part of Mr. Poghosian’s success formula is based on making it more profitable for local farmers to raise both the number and quality of their livestock. Right now there are few such incentives since the small local market has only limited demand for meat.

And making a life in the homeland

“So far, I have not really begun doing business here,” Mr. Poghosian admits. “In New York I could easily see a 150 percent return within a year.

“By the end of the year my investments are likely to total $3 million, and possibly more since the exchange rate of the U.S. dollar is continuing to fall here. And since I am not that rich I will need to see a substantial return next year to make this business sustainable and successful in the long-term.”

Certainly, this is not just another business opportunity for Mr. Poghosian.

“Our compatriots have for centuries longed for the return of our ancestral lands and an independent Armenian state. Let me remind everyone, it is finally here!”

With infectious enthusiasm, Mr. Poghosian calls on his fellow Armenians in the diaspora to set aside the usual set of complaints about living and working in Armenia and capitalize on the historic opportunity:

“Come, make your homeland for yourself!”

CFE Treaty and Caucasus

First published in the July 28, 2007 Armenian Reporter

Can an international treaty restrain the Caucasus arms race?
by Emil Sanamyan

YEREVAN – The Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty, a relatively obscure agreement concluded toward the end of the Cold War between the countries of the Soviet-dominated Warsaw Pact and NATO, and since modified in part to adapt to post-Soviet realities, is in the news again.

CFE is a particularly important treaty for countries like Armenia and its Caucasus neighbors, which rely solely on conventional forces for their defense needs. The treaty limits the number of soldiers, aircraft, large-caliber artillery, tanks, and other armored vehicles each country that is party to the treaty is allowed to have.

It also provides for a reporting and inspection mechanism, wherein each participating country reports annually on its holdings of treaty-limited equipment, their exact location, as well as acquisition and retirement of weapons. With Caucasus states continuing to build up their militaries, the CFE, at least in theory, should be able to put a break on this ongoing militarization in the region.
Strategic gambit with tactical consequences

In recent weeks Russian officials have called for the revision of the CFE and even threatened to suspend Russia’s participation. These pronouncements came shortly
after the summit between Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin at Kennebunkport, Maine, in which the Russian president offered strategic cooperation
on missile defense, a proposal so far met with little enthusiasm in the United States.

With the United States going ahead with its plans to install missile- defense facilities in Central Europe, Russia’s threats are more likely to reflect its annoyance at being ignored rather than a plan to remake or do away with CFE.

But if for Russia and the U.S. CFE is just one of the pieces of their strategic chessboard, and there are no real threats of conventional wars in most of Europe, things are different in the Caucasus, with its unresolved conflicts.

Currently Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia are all limited to the same number of tanks (220 each), armored vehicles (220), artillery (280), and aircraft (100 jets and 50 helicopters).

Azerbaijani officials have long called for raising their limits on the number of weapon systems, as part of their effort to gain a military edge over Armenia
and Nagorno-Karabakh. Russia’s calls for revision of the treaty thus provide a potential window of opportunity for Azerbaijan to exploit. That country is already believed to be in violation of several of the treaty limitations, and flush with oil revenue it has in recent years become a particularly eager buyer of weapons systems.

Basis for a regional security regime

The cease-fire regime between Armenians and Azerbaijanis that has held for over thirteen years is largely self-regulated. In other words it is based on a conscious decision by both sides not to restart hostilities, at least not now.

Still the attitude of the international community, especially its major players – U.S., Russia, and European states – continues to be a major factor in the two sides’ behavior.

Most significantly, these states have encouraged the sides to maintain the relative peace and to see that all outstanding issues are dealt with through negotiations
mediated by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

While no peacekeeping forces have been deployed, the OSCE has the Office of the Personal Representative, which conducts monthly monitoring of the cease-fire regime along the Line of Contact.

The CFE treaty has also served as a kind of confidence-building measure. Every year, all treaty participants exchange information on the location of their military units,
the number of their personnel, and weapons holdings. So, in theory, the Armenian side is informed, although with some delay, about the location and make-up of all of Azerbaijan’s military units, and vice versa.

…and a mutual deception mechanism

But each side has been engaged in one form of deception or another.

On the one hand, Azerbaijan claims it has “retired” several hundred tanks and its holding are right around the 220 ceiling. But it can be argued that a number of these “retired” systems could be quickly brought back into service or at the very least cannibalized for parts.

Azerbaijanis have also spread heavy weapons through services other than the armed forces proper – the Special State Security Service, Ministry of Internal Affairs, State Border Guard Service, and even the Ministry of Emergency Management.

In all, Armenian commentators believe that Azerbaijan’s tank holdings are at about 500, with individual units in various states of readiness.

On the Armenian side, the size and make-up of the Karabakh Defense Army are not publicly reported – since Nagorno-Karabakh Republic is not a party to CFE – and its equipment is not counted toward the Armenian military’s ceiling. Armenia reports having only 110 tanks.

Since 1999 Azerbaijan has claimed that Karabakh Armenian forces alone have more than 300 tanks, likely an exaggerated figure, but a frequently cited one in the absence of other estimates.

Treaty participants have also sought to report as little information as possible, and there is apparently an effort to keep some facilities off limits and out of annual filings.

While there is a mechanism that entitles every participating state to send an inspection delegation to any other participating state, no Armenian delegation has been allowed to go into Azerbaijan.

Turkish inspectors have regularly visited Armenia, but not Nagorno-Karabakh.

Questions about CFE and its viability

CFE remains the only existing international security framework within which the continuing arms race in the Caucasus could at least be monitored if not contained. Therefore, a potential unraveling of the treaty owing to U.S.-Russian tensions does not augur well for the Caucasus region and the rest of Europe.

But the fact that participating countries have also exploited the treaty loopholes to keep a portion of their weapon holdings off the books and have not been sanctioned
as a result has also created a sense among member countries that they do not need to leave the CFE to be able to overcome its restraints.

Backgrounds: Bako Sahakian and Masis Mayilian

First published in July 21, 2007 Armenian Reporter

Man in the News: Bako Sahakian

STEPANAKERT, Karabakh – As journalists and observers entered Karabakh this week through the winding mountain road, they were met by unusually cool and rainy weather and a banner, “Bako Sahakian is our candidate” straddling the main road through the Kashatagh district.

And on July 19, as voters flocked to polling stations around Karabakh to vote for their next president, the 46-year-old Mr. Sahakian had the biggest advantage any candidate could wish for: a widespread public belief in his inevitable victory.

***

This expectation began to take shape last spring after Mr. Sahakian, the director of Karabakh’s National Security Service, was nominated on a civic initiative and soon received endorsements from leaders of all four political parties represented in Karabakh’s parliament; the war veterans’ association, Karabakh’s most important nongovernmental group; and most recently President Arkady Ghoukassian.

Still, in a July 17 interview with the Armenian Reporter, Mr. Sahakian said that he is “not a pro-establishment candidate,” and that he sees both “achievements and shortcomings” in Mr. Ghoukassian’s presidency.

When asked to name some of the shortcomings, however, Mr. Sahakian declined to go into specifics. He did note, however, that public concerns with social and economic problems, such as availability of well-paying jobs and state-funded infrastructure and services, are the focus of his campaign.

Mr. Sahakian appeared able to win over the two main segments of the Karabakh electorate – those who are generally happy with the outgoing president’s policies and see Mr. Sahakian as a supporter of the status quo, and those who seek a stepped-up government reform effort.

In the July 17 interview, Mr. Sahakian also argued for the continuation of the government policy of insisting on Karabakh’s participation in negotiations on the future status of the republic.

Asked if Karabakh should take steps to seek unilateral recognition of the republic, Mr. Sahakian said that he did “not think it was the right approach” and held out hope that direct negotiations between Karabakh and Azerbaijan would bring about a mutually agreeable result.

And when asked whether Karabakh should participate more actively in the Russia-backed effort to coalesce the four unrecognized republics in the former Soviet territory, and act through a joint platform, Mr. Sahakian was noncommittal, adding that issues that “do not contradict our interests can become a subject for discussion.”

***

A Stepanakert native and graduate of one of the local high schools, Mr. Sahakian did his mandatory military service and then began an initially unremarkable career as a skilled worker and then a supplies specialist for the local government.

But just as for other Karabakhis, for Mr. Sahakian things changed radically in 1988 with the start of the movement for reunification with Armenia. He joined the Karabakh self-defense forces in 1990 and from 1992 and throughout the war was one of the key persons responsible for supplying these forces with everything they needed, from food to weapons. Mr. Sahakian was decorated with Karabakh’s highest medal for valor – the Combat Cross, first degree.

From 1997 to 1999, Mr. Sahakian was seconded to Armenia’s Ministry of Interior and National Security (then headed by the current Prime Minister Serge Sargsian). Because that assignment involved a lengthy posting in Moscow, Mr. Sahakian’s opponents suggested that he may not fulfill the 10-year residency requirement for presidential nominees. But the Central Electoral Commission ruled that in those years Mr. Sahakian remained in state service and therefore was qualified to run.

In 1999, Mr. Sahakian returned to Karabakh to serve first as the Interior (Police) Minister and since 2001 as National Security Service director, a position he resigned last month when he sought registration as a candidate.

To those who observed him closely in Stepanakert, he is known as a decent family man with street smarts and a knack for justice and keeping his word. As minister and government service director Mr. Sahakian was praised for his energy, leadership skills, and defense of the small guy. And even his current opponents have seen him as a potential ally for reform.

Emil Sanamyan

Man in the News: Masis Mayilian

STEPANAKERT, Karabakh – Here in Stepanakert at least, 39-year-old presidential candidate Masis Mayilian appeared to be running a campaign as prominent as that of frontrunner Bako Sahakian, at least if judged by the availability of posters. Outside the capital, however, the story was different and Mr. Sahakian’s visibility was clearly unrivaled.

But even in Stepanakert, Mr. Mayilian’s sole campaign office was located in the office of an electronics store located on a side street, while Mr. Sahakian’s campaign boasted nine offices.

Despite a clear mismatch in resources and financial support, Mr. Mayilian himself insisted in a July 17 interview with the Armenian Reporter that he was “only thinking of victory.”

Mr. Mayilian announced his intention to run for president later than the other four candidates, and just as the deadline for nominations was approaching. Asked why he decided to run, Mr. Mayilian pointed to 15 years of experience in government, and expressed a conviction that he was in a position to implement “a program of reforms in order to strengthen our country and speed up its development tempo.”

Mr. Mayilian also claimed that the political parties’ decision not to nominate their own candidates, but jointly endorse Mr. Sahakian put the “conduct of elections under threat.” He argued that “were it not for my nomination, this would have become not an election, but an appointment with no real alternative offered.”

The focus of Mr. Mayilian’s campaign has been on “real reform, supremacy of the law, and international recognition of Artsakh.” He pointed to what he called “conservative forces that have united around the [Sahakian] candidacy” and suggested that the current political struggle transcends the traditional authorities-opposition divide and pits reformers against supporters of the status quo in both camps.

And, Mr. Mayilian continued, although leaders of all major political forces have endorsed Mr. Sahakian, many rank-and-file members, as well as many midlevel state officials are backing Mr. Mayilian, but are reluctant to do so openly.

Mr. Mayilian’s supporters have complained to the Central Election Commission that local officials have been hampering his campaign and supporting Mr. Sahakian. One Mayilian supporter in Mardakert region was reportedly forced to retire from his job in the state natural gas utility as he made his political preference public.

Mr. Mayilian also said that all seats on central and local electoral commissions are controlled by appointees of the president and parliamentary parties that have endorsed Mr. Sahakian, and that Mr. Mayilian’s campaign is only represented by observers.

“I only hope that [electoral commission members] would be guided by state thinking and patriotism and would not approve of falsifications,” he said, adding that he hoped “the voting and counting are conducted in a normal way without violations.”

A native of Stepanakert, Mr. Mayilian graduated from the local high school and, following mandatory army service, from the mathematics faculty of the local pedagogic institute in 1991. For about a year, Mr. Mayilian was enrolled at the Yerevan State University graduate school studying social psychology, but then in 1992, as fighting raged throughout Karabakh, he decided to return to his hometown to work in the State Defense Committee as media liaison.

Mr. Mayilian became one of the first staff members of Karabakh’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, established in 1993, and rose through the ranks to become deputy minister in 2001. Throughout his years at the ministry he was one of the key individuals representing Karabakh in international negotiations and is widely considered to be one of Karabakh’s most experienced diplomats.

Most local voters praise Mr. Mayilian as smart and incorruptible, but many also point to his lack of experience in running domestic affairs.

Emil Sanamyan