Analysis: Did Buddhism inspire Serge Sargsian's policies?

The Middle Way of Serge Sargsian
by Emil Sanamyan

This was first published in the December 2009 issue of Stepanakert-based Analyticon journal.

Bodhisattva Prabhapala is invited by the Devas in the Tushita Heaven to come down on earth to save all beings. (Description from http://home.swipnet.se/ratnashri/buddhalife.htm)

"I am not one of those people who argue that it doesn’t matter if relations with Turkey and Azerbaijan remain unresolved and borders closed and that this [status quo] does not interfere with our development,” Serge Sargsian, then still prime minister and emerging presidential candidate told me in an interview in October 2007.

They do, he said, but "at the same time, I believe that these challenges cannot bring us to our knees; I don’t want to sound pretentious but this is the heart of the matter.”

In subsequent months, as presidential candidate in a bruising electoral contest and then as president-elect in its deadly aftermath, Sargsian tried to position himself as a compromise-minded moderate in contrast to confrontational styles of his predecessor Robert Kocharian and main election opponent Levon Ter-Petrossian.

Now, as the second year of Armenia’s third president is drawing to a close, Sargsian appears to have embraced the philosophy of "dignified compromise” in a foreign policy dominated by disputes with Turkey and Azerbaijan.

In Buddhist philosophy, the middle (or third) way is the path between the two extremes, one of fully rejecting the material world and another – fully indulging in it.

This thinking seeks to avoid the two extremist worldviews that perceive the world as either eternal or facing an inevitable annihilation.

When transposing these concepts to Armenia’s political landscape, the two extremes between which Sargsian is charting his course are Ter-Petrossian’s visions of doomsday Armenia and Kocharian’s wishful notion of "Armenia of our dreams.”

Reflections of this choice can be seen in specific policies embraced by Sargsian administration with regard to Turkey and Azerbaijan.

New approach on Turkey

Like his predecessors, Sargsian made establishment of relations with Turkey as he put it "In Spite of the Genocide” an early priority.

But unlike Ter-Petrossian, Sargsian did not completely drop the campaign for genocide recognition from Armenia’s agenda. And unlike Kocharian, Sargsian says the legacy of genocide would be best addressed through engagement with Turkey rather that by trying to mobilize the sympathetic support in the rest of the world.

Last October, while making the case for the Armenia-Turkey protocols to anxious and critical leaders of Diaspora in America, Sargsian sounded much more like Ter-Petrossian. In particular, seeking to justify the agreement Sargsian strongly linked prospects of Armenia’s development to Turkey’s good will rather than Armenians’ own determination as Kocharian normally would.

Not surprisingly, Ter-Petrossian has on the whole welcomed agreements with Turkey. And while Kocharian has not publicly reacted to the protocols, sources familiar with his position say that he is opposed to them but has not made his opposition public not to undermine Sargsian in his continued stand-off with Ter-Petrossian.

But whatever the intricacies of the new approaches, like its predecessors’ it has so far failed to produce a breakthrough from the seemingly perpetual diplomatic dance with Turkey.

New rhetoric on Karabakh

On Karabakh too Sargsian has adjusted his policy language away from Kocharian’s and closer to that of Ter-Petrossian.

Ter-Petrossian’s approach was to distance Armenia from taking a position on Karabakh settlement. Even as Armenia refused to either annex Nagorno Karabakh or recognize its independence, Ter-Petrossian administration as matter of policy said that it was up to Karabakh Armenians to determine their status.

Under Kocharian, Armenia was more straightforward: Karabakh can not be subordinated to Azerbaijan and only "horizontal” relations were possible, officials would say. Moreover, Armenia would recognize Nagorno Karabakh in response to Azerbaijan shifting the Karabakh issue from OSCE mediation to the United Nations.

By contrast, today Armenia talks of a solution that would be based on "self-
determination” by Karabakh Armenians. When asked by The Armenian Reporter last October about the change in policy language, Sargsian in fact did not rule out Karabakh’s subordination to Azerbaijan even as he implied it was impossible.

Nevertheless, Azerbaijan has long argued that Karabakh Armenians’ right to self-determination could be exercised as part of Azerbaijan. By not explicitly dismissing this notion, Sargsian, like Ter-Petrossian, leaves open such possibility.

Sargsian also leaves open the possibility of recognizing Karabakh but only as response to Azerbaijan’s military aggression, a more remote possibility than another diplomatic initiative like, say, an Azerbaijani appeal to the International Court of Justice.

Here too, verbal exercises disguise the reality that any comprehensive solution or even a significant shift from the status quo is far from imminent.

Third way advantages…

Even as Sargsian calibrates his approaches away from Kocharian’s "extreme” closer to although by no means in line with Ter-Petrossian’s "extreme,” the third president’s "middle” approach demonstrates its advantages such as initiative, flexibility and, as a result, unpredictability.

On Turkey, Sargsian pledged not to agree to a historical commission but he, in effect, did. He said he would not go to Turkey unless the border was open or about to open. That visit was three months ago, and the border is as closed as it was before.
Now, Sargsian is talking about rescinding Armenia’s signature from the protocols unless they are ratified by the Turkish parliament in the next few months; and he might just do that. Or not.

On Karabakh too, while Sargsian’s rhetoric has been much more conciliatory, he did not endorse the Madrid principles after they were published in July.

Moreover, Armenia’s position in the talks appears to have hardened in the last few months, with Sargsian shifting the agenda of talks back to Karabakh’s status as was the case under Kocharian.

Early on in his presidency, Sargsian brought renewed emphasis to key notions of preservation of relative peace and prevention of escalation to war, reflected particularly in his speeches at the United Nations and at the Munich Security Conference.

Those arguments again contrasted with those by his predecessors that appeared to offer a stark choice between permanent warfare and permanent separation.

...and drawbacks

It is unknown if Sargsian or his advisors consult Buddhist philosophers. More likely, occupying a mid-point position between revived Ter-Petrossian and therefore adjusting away from Kocharian’s course must have appeared as a sensible move politically.

In Buddhist tradition, realization of the middle way depends on "the Noble Eightfold path,” that includes "right understanding, right thought, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness and right concentration."

It remains to be seen if the third president is up to the task and can uphold and balance this more than a handful of rights while keeping wrongs to the minimum.

While the approach may be seen as more practical or realistic on the whole it also carries more obvious risks. Political initiatives – such as Sargsian’s on Turkey – tend to heighten domestic expectations and generate counter-initiatives abroad.

In the end, effectiveness of Sargsian’s "middle way” like his predecessors’ will be judged on whether it avoids disasters and produces results for Armenia.

- Emil Sanamyan is Washington editor for The Armenian Reporter.

Serge Sargsian: Greatest risk is that protocols will be defeated

President discusses Genocide, Turkey policy in The Armenian Reporter exclusive
Karabakh agreement is not imminent
by Armenian Reporter staff
Published: Thursday October 01, 2009

President Serge Sargsian addresses a gathering of over 50 political parties in Armenia, Sept. 17. He called the meeting to discuss the protocols on Armenia-Turkey relations. Photolure

YEREVAN - President Serge Sargsian expressed confidence about Armenians' ability to benefit from the proposed normalization of relations with Turkey, even as he acknowledged that the planned signing of protocols with Turkey also involved risks and downsides.

Mr. Sargsian responded to questions posed by the editors of the Armenian Reporter ahead of a five-city, four-country tour that starts this week and includes visits to New York and Los Angeles on October 3 and 4, during which he said he intends to "consult" with Armenian diaspora communities on Armenia's Turkey policy.

Asked about the rewards and risks of proceeding with ratification and implementation of the protocols between Armenia and Turkey, the president said that with an end to the Turkish blockade of Armenia, "a potential market with a population of 70 million opens before our producers." He argued that "the greatest risk is that the protocols will not be implemented."

Non-implementation "will deepen the atmosphere of mistrust and enmity in the region," Mr. Sargsian warned. "For a long time after that, no politician will be able to touch the issue of normalizing Armenia-Turkey relations."

The Karabakh connection

For the protocols to be implemented, they must be ratified by the parliaments of Armenia and Turkey. Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has repeatedly linked the opening of the border with Armenia, promised in the protocols, to satisfaction of Azerbaijan's demands in the Karabakh peace process.

On the Karabakh issue, Mr. Sargsian revealed that he did "not expect to sign any document in Moldova" during his meeting with Azerbaijan's Ilham Aliyev during the Commonwealth of Independent States summit on October 8.

"Let me go further: in view of the limited progress we have made on agreeing to very few portions of the Madrid Document, we are quite far from signing any document at this stage," the president told the Armenian Reporter.

Mr. Sargsian took the position that normalization of relations with Turkey would help generate the kind of trust in the region that is a prerequisite for the resolution of the Karabakh conflict. Moreover, he said, "The only way Turkey can help the resolution of the Karabakh conflict is by not interfering."

"In spite of the Genocide"

Mr. Sargsian expressed his interest in the normalization of relations with Turkey even before his election as president. On December 22, 2006, as defense minister, he authored a Wall Street Journal op-ed "In spite of the Genocide..." As prime minister, Mr. Sargsian reiterated the position in an October 22, 2007, conversation with the Armenian Reporter and elsewhere.

Since the start of his presidency in April 2008, Mr. Sargsian has made normalization of relations with Turkey a centerpiece of his foreign policy.

In this week's interview, the president conceded that as a result of the provisions of the protocols, "perhaps in some countries and in some circumstances, the Armenian lobby will face certain difficulties" in pursuing affirmation of the Armenian Genocide. But, he added, "It must also be understood that there are bound to be certain complications in such a difficult process."

He expressed confidence, however, that "sooner or later" all the countries that have not yet recognized the Armenian Genocide will do so. He did not elaborate.

"The overarching purpose of the process for the international recognition of the Armenian Genocide is to see the Turkish people and Turkey follow the lead of numerous civilized countries and recognize the fact of the Genocide," the president added. "There is the current generation of Turks, who must come to terms with their own history. I think our present initiative is opening doors for this internal discussion, this internal reconciliation."

The full text of the interview appears here.

Serge Sargsian meets Diaspora on Armenia-Turkey protocols

President Sargsyan promotes Turkey protocols in diaspora meetings
ARF stages street protests in New York and Los Angeles
by Emil Sanamyan
Published: Tuesday October 06, 2009

President Serge Sargsian meets with representatives of American-Armenian and Canadian-Armenian groups in New York, Oct. 3, 2009. Press Office of the President of Armenia

NEW YORK - At meetings in New York and Los Angeles on October 3 and 4, representatives of American-Armenian and Canadian-Armenian groups had an exchange of views with President Serge Sargsyan on the agreement on the normalization of relations initialed between Armenia and Turkey. The meetings were part of a longer presidential tour with stops in France, Lebanon, and Russia.

According to Turkish officials, the protocols on diplomatic relations and bilateral cooperation are expected to be signed by the foreign ministers of the two countries in Zurich, Switzerland, on October 10. Armenian officials have not yet confirmed that date.

Armenian officials requested that the diaspora discussions be treated as off the record, although many of the statements delivered by organizations were made public either before or after the meetings.

The October 3 New York meeting included representatives from the eastern United States and Canada, with representatives from the western United States and Latin America attending the Los Angeles meeting the following day.

The meetings were by invitation only. No public appearances were organized, and an anticipated presidential interview with three Los Angeles-area Armenian television channels did not take place.

Debate in New York

The New York event involved about 50 participants from the diaspora, representing several dozen organizations, sitting at tables arranged in a large square, with media sitting at a separate table. President Sargsyan's delegation included former president of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic Arkady Ghoukasian, the chairperson of Armenia's Constitutional Court Gagik Harutiunian, Diaspora Minister Hranush Hakobyan, and a dozen or more aides and diplomats.

Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandian, who handled the negotiations over the protocols and is expected to be the one to sign the documents on Armenia's behalf, was not in the delegation. Neither were any members of parliament; the protocols require parliamentary ratification to go into effect.

Diaspora organizations represented included this newspaper's parent company CS Media and the U.S.-Armenia Public Affairs Committee (USAPAC). In attendance were archbishops and other clergy from the Eastern and Canadian dioceses and prelacies of the Armenian Church, representatives of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF), Armenian National Committee of America, and affiliated groups in the eastern United States and Canada, the Armenian General Benevolent Union and its associated organizations, the Armenian Assembly of America and its affiliates, the Zoryan Institute, the Fund for Armenian Relief, the Armenia Fund, Birthright Armenia, and the Congress of Canadian Armenians.

Vartan Gregorian, president of the Carnegie Corporation of New York, Andranik Migranian, a Russian-Armenian community leader and former Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation Commission member now working in New York, and Vahan Kololian of the Mosaic Institute of Toronto were also present.

Media representatives in attendance included the Armenian Reporter, the New York-based freelancer Florence Avakian, Ardzagank TV (which also reports for Voice of America Armenian Service), AGBU and Ararat magazines, the Boston-based Hairenik, Armenian Weekly, and Armenian Mirror-Spectator newspapers, and the Montreal-based Horizon newspaper.

The event began with on-the-record introductory remarks by the president. He reiterated his determination to proceed toward normalization of relations with Turkey, while also admitting to a number of reservations and concerns, many of which he had shared in his interview with the Armenian Reporter last week.

Mr. Sargsyan, who in the early 1990s was commander of Karabakh self-defense forces, compared the ongoing talks with Turkey to the war in Karabakh. The war was incredibly difficult and few initially expected Armenian success, he said, but it was also unavoidable.

Just as Armenians prevailed in the war, Mr. Sargsyan said, he fully expected to be successful in talks with Turkey as well, which he also described as difficult but unavoidable.

He also argued that the process of normalization of relations with Turkey was not an excuse for a curtailment of genocide-affirmation efforts.

On the subject of talks with Azerbaijan, Mr. Sargsyan confirmed the long-standing Armenian position that Nagorno-Karabakh cannot be made part of Azerbaijan and that any settlement required serious security guarantees for its Armenian population.

The president's 40-minute introduction was followed by more than 40 statements, remarks, and questions from various organizations and individuals that continued for nearly four hours uninterrupted.

The views expressed ranged from unreservedly supportive to highly critical of the president's policy on the Turkey protocols. There were a number of tense exchanges.

Following the diaspora presentations, and comments by Mr. Ghoukasian and Mr. Harutiunian, Mr. Sargsyan wrapped up the meeting by responding to some of the concerns and questions posed.

According to participants in the Los Angeles meeting, the event involved about 60 diaspora representatives, with the president responding to points raised after each of about 30 presentations. At that meeting, while a number of disagreements were voiced, the discussion remained civil.

Angry protests

Throughout the president's tour, the ARF organized street protests, with many thousands reportedly turning out in Los Angeles on October 4, while up to 200 were seen picketing in New York the day before.

In New York the protestors came from as far away as Boston, Chicago, and Washington. They held placards saying "Voch" (no) to the protocols, telling the president "Mi Davachanir" (or Mi tavajanir, Do not betray), and announcing that Mr. Sargsyan was "not welcome in New York."

According to the Armenian Weekly, a smaller group of protestors at one point entered the New York hotel where the meeting was taking place; the protestors' chanting briefly became audible inside the meeting hall, before the New York police and the U.S. Secret Service intervened.

Video reports available online indicate the Los Angeles protest included similar slogans and also involved a brief attempt by protestors to cross the police barricade, but no serious incidents.

According to Asbarez, some 200 activists set up a human barricade around the Armenian Genocide monument in Montebello, as activists in Paris had done two days earlier, in order to prevent President Sargsyan from laying flowers there. The president did not show up at Montebello at the time the demonstrators had expected him.

Also, a hunger strike, organized by the Armenian Youth Federation, kicked off on Monday, October 5, at midnight, and was to last for 96 hours until midnight Friday.

Paris

In Paris on Friday, October 2, the president had lunch with crooner Charles Aznavour, who serves as Armenia's ambassador to Switzerland. He met with representatives of community organizations, after which he was scheduled to lay a wreath at the Armenian Genocide memorial on the banks of the Seine River.

French police spent an hour dragging some 300 French-Armenian protesters out of the way, Tatul Hakobyan reported from the scene. Once the protesters had been removed, the president approached the statue, spent a few moments there, and placed a small wreath.

Beirut

In Lebanon on October 6, Mr. Sargsyan met with over 100 individuals representing various organizations operating in Middle Eastern Armenian communities, including Egypt and Iran. Before the meeting, the president met with Aram I, Catholicos of the Great House of Cilicia, who has been critical of the protocols.

Thousands of protesters gathered outside the president's hotel.

Hagop Pakradouni, one of six Armenian deputies in Lebanon's parliament, said the community supported improved ties between Armenia and Turkey - but not at any price, according to AFP.

Rostov on Don

In Rostov on Don, Russia, the next day, the president met with representatives of Russian-Armenian groups and discussed Armenian-Turkish relations.

Armenia's former deputy defense minister and chief of general staff in the early 90s, General Norat Ter-Grigoriants, said, "The nation is opposed to the protocols. You could just not sign them, and you will be treated as a national hero."

Ara Abrahamian, the president of the powerful Union of Armenians in Russia, suggested that more time was needed for expert analysis of all the consequences of the protocols, warning that the deal would probably shelve the international recognition campaign for years to come.

In a September interview with the Armenian Reporter, Mr. Abrahamian had expressed concerns about the terms of the protocols. Regarding the proposed intergovernmental commission on the "historical dimension," he had said, "If you want to bury an issue, give it to a committee." He had also expressed reservations about the recognition of existing borders between Armenia and Turkey.

Armenian president to discuss Turkey protocols on diaspora tour
by Emil Sanamyan
Published: Thursday September 24, 2009

WASHINGTON - President Serge Sargsian will visit Armenian communities, including those in Paris, New York, Los Angeles, Rostov-on-Don in Russia, and Beirut starting at the end of next week, according to diplomatic sources involved in organizing the trip.

The visit is intended to outline Armenia's policy vis-à-vis Turkey. On August 31 Armenia and Turkey announced their intention to sign protocols on diplomatic relations and bilateral cooperation after six weeks of domestic discussions. Under the protocols, Turkey agrees to open the land border with Armenia.

Some major Armenian-American organizations have endorsed the protocols while expressing concern about certain provisions. Others have been more critical. In recent days, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation has organized protests at the Armenian Mission to United Nations in New York, as well as in Los Angeles.

Mr. Sargsian's visit to New York is expected to include a meeting with representatives of Armenian-American groups on October 3. That would be followed by a similar meeting as well as a televised press conference in Los Angeles.

International context

The Armenian president's trip comes just ahead of yet another summit meeting between him and his Azerbaijani counterpart Ilham Aliyev, which is expected to take place in Moldova on October 8 or 9. The signing of Armenia-Turkey protocols by the foreign ministers of Armenia and Turkey is due on October 13.

Turkish leaders have said that implementation of the protocols is contingent on satisfaction of Azerbaijan's concerns in the Karabakh dispute. Armenian officials for their part reject the link, noting that the published protocols make no reference to the Karabakh conflict.

Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan reiterated the Karabakh linkage during his meeting with Jewish-American groups in New York on September 22, Today's Zaman reported, citing the Anatolia news agency.

The United States has reemerged as an informal facilitator of Armenia-Turkey talks, with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton discussing the issues in a phone call to President Sargsian on September 19, the Armenian president's office reported.

U.S. officials have called for progress on both the Karabakh and Armenia-Turkey tracks but they have formally opposed a direct linkage between the two.

More protocols discord, U.S. and Turkey on missiles

This was first published in the September 19, 2009 Armenian Reporter

Washington Briefing
by Emil Sanamyan

Armenian-American groups split on Turkey protocols

The protocols on the establishments of bilateral relations and diplomatic relations that Armenia and Turkey are expected to sign on October 13 continue to be debated by Armenian-Americans.

The traditional political parties – the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnaks), the Social Democratic Hunchakian Party, and the Armenian Democratic Liberal Party (Ramkavars) – have opposed the initiative, while the Armenian Assembly of America (AAA) and the Armenian General Benevolent Union (AGBU) have issued conditional endorsements.

In a September 9 letter addressed to President Barack Obama, leaders of the AAA and AGBU and the primates of the Eastern and Western Dioceses of the Armenian Church referred to the protocols and said they "look[ed] forward to a positive outcome" and the normalization of relations.

At the same time, they expressed concern with Turkey's efforts to link talks with Armenia to the Karabakh peace process and warned that "if this normalization process is used as a smokescreen for not reaffirming the Armenian Genocide and the U.S. record, it will be a blow to the rapprochement process."

Meanwhile, in Southern California, the protocols' opponents have organized a series of public protests and public meetings to denounce the deal as compromising Armenian interests. Much of the criticism has focused on the impact the protocols would have on efforts to win international condemnation of the Armenian Genocide and address its consequences.

In Washington, the Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA) will organize two town hall-style meetings to discuss the protocols on September 24 and 26.

(For Turkish reaction to the protocols see http://www.reporter.am/go/article/2009-09-26-the-turkish-press-reacts-to-the-armenia-protocols.)

U.S. scraps European missile defense plan, launches fresh Iran diplomacy

The Obama administration decided to cancel the former president's plan to place missile interceptors and radars in Poland and the Czech Republic, officials were quoted as saying on September 17.

The Bush administration had said it wanted the new military installations to counter a potential missile threat from Iran. But the plan was strongly opposed by Russian leaders, who saw it as undermining their country's nuclear weapons deterrent.

The decision this week to scrap the plan was welcomed by Russia as well as several European officials. Russia's President Dmitry Medvedev called the decision a "responsible approach" and said he looked forward to dialogue with the United States during meetings at the United Nations next week.

Also next week, President Obama will become the first American president to chair a United Nations Security Council session. According to Politico newspaper, the United States will introduce a new resolution that would make the pursuit of peaceful nuclear energy contingent on countries' not being in violation of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. Commentators see the initiative as aimed at building an international consensus against Iran's nuclear program.

The resolution would also include a pledge by nuclear-armed countries not to use nuclear weapons against countries that don't have such weapons.

Officials from the five permanent Security Council member states (which include Russia) plus Germany are due to hold talks with Iran on October 1.

Turkey seeks upgraded missile defense shield

The Turkish government is considering proposals on ways to improve its missile defense capabilities, including a potential $7.8 billion deal with U.S. companies, news media reported.

On September 11, the Obama administration notified Congress of the possible sale, involving Raytheon and Lockheed Martin, two of the largest U.S. weapons' manufacturers, which have also long lobbied for Turkish interests in the United States.

Reacting to the U.S. announcement, the Turkish Defense Ministry noted that as part of a request for proposals unveiled last April, Ankara was considering offers from the United States, Russia, and China for the purchase of missile defense systems, with no final decisions yet made.

According to Zaman, Turkey's defense budget amounted to $11 billion in 2008, but the country's weapons acquisition is believed to be covered from non-budget sources that are not fully disclosed. In recent years, Turkey has increasingly been buying weapons from non-U.S. sources.

If it goes through, the deal would become part of a U.S. effort to deter Iran by establishing what U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton described last July as a "defense umbrella" for America's Middle East allies.

Iran already has the capability to launch missiles at any part of Turkey's territory.

Reaction to protocols, NK anniversary, Caspian and Abkhazia disputes

This was first published in the September 5, 2009 Armenian Reporter.

Washington Briefing
by Emil Sanamyan

Congressional, Armenian-American reaction to protocols is mixed

The announcement by Armenia and Turkey of their intention to sign protocols that could pave the way for diplomatic relations have elicited a slew of reactions from members of Congress and Armenian-American organizations.

Rep. Adam Schiff (D.-Calif.), who represents the congressional district with the largest number of Armenian-Americans, initially issued a statement "welcoming what may be an important step between Armenia and Turkey."

The statement issued on the morning of September 1 also expressed hope for the full normalization of relations, including lifting of Turkey's blockade, but stressed that "true reconciliation" would only come when Turkey recognizes the Armenian Genocide.

But less than four hours later, Mr. Schiff issued an expanded statement that sounded more skeptical of the development.

"While I welcome what may be an important step in the rapprochement between Armenia and Turkey," Mr. Schiff wrote, "I have serious concerns about some provisions of the protocols accompanying the announcement."

The Representative specifically suggested that "the protocols call for the creation of an historical commission to review the events of 1915-23."

Although the protocols do not actually refer to the events of 1915-23, they do cite a need to "restore mutual confidence" via a dialogue on the "historical dimension" of relations that would involve "impartial scientific examination of the historical records."

In between the two statements by Rep. Schiff, the Armenian National Committee of America issued a statement titled, "ANCA Warns Capitol Hill about Dangers of Turkey-Armenia Protocols."

The statement included a memo by ANCA executive director Aram Hamparian expressing "serious concern" that the protocols "prejudice the security of Armenia and the rights of all Armenians."

Mr. Hamparian claimed that Armenia was forced into agreeing to the protocols "under intense economic and diplomatic pressure." He expressed particular concern about what he called the "historical commission."

The ANCA also noted that immediately after the release of the protocols, senior Turkish officials indicated they intended to continue to stall the normalization process.

The Armenian Assembly of America (AAA) also expressed concerns with Turkey's "track record of broken promises" with regard to relations with Armenia.

But unlike the ANCA, the AAA appeared satisfied with the content of the protocols. The AAA release, dated September 2, said that the group "supports normalization of relations between Armenia and Turkey without preconditions" and viewed the release of the protocols as an "important step" toward that aim.

On September 3, the co-chairs of the Armenian Congressional Caucus, Reps. Frank Pallone (D.-N.J.) and Mark Kirk (R.-Ill.) issued a statement on the protocols.

The co-chairs said they were "concerned with Turkey's willingness to cooperate in the matter" of normalizing relations, and added, "Any attempt to include a review of historical fact, such as the Armenian Genocide, or to include the ongoing Nagorno Karabakh peace process into these negotiations stands in direct opposition to the intent of these talks."

Caucus co-chairs reiterate call for “international recognition” on Karabakh jubilee

"We continue to join you in the call for formal international recognition of your independence," Reps. Frank Pallone (D.-N.J.) and Mark Kirk (R,-Ill.) declared in a September 2 letter addressed to Nagorno-Karabakh's President Bako Sahakian on the republic's Independence Day.

The Nagorno-Karabakh Republic was declared on September 2, 1991, with its independence receiving overwhelming support in a referendum held in subsequent December.

In a recent interview with the Armenian Reporter, Mr. Pallone had expressed his willingness to work toward U.S. recognition of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, as he also acknowledged the task would be difficult to accomplish.

The U.S. government "has to realize that according to the Soviet legal framework, Nagorno-Karabakh had self-government and certain rights, including holding a referendum and becoming an independent country, which is what had happened," Mr. Pallone noted in the interview.

Turkmenistan ratchets up rhetoric in Caspian dispute with Azerbaijan

Turkmenistan will build up its naval forces in the Caspian, its President Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov declared on August 31, RFE/RL and other media reported. The buildup would include a new naval base and the purchase of missile-armed vessels.

The two countries have failed to agree on their maritime affairs after years of intermittent talks. The recent pronouncements come following several high-level summits between Azerbaijani and Turkmenistani leaders that seemed to indicate a warming in relations.

But in a surprise development last month, Turkmenistan said it would launch a legal case against Azerbaijan in an international court over several disputed offshore oilfields.

The disputed area includes the Azeri and Chirag oilfields that have accounted for the bulk of Azerbaijan's oil production in the last decade, which has already brought it billions of dollars in revenue.

The reignited Azerbaijani-Turkmenistani disagreements may also have been the reason for a recently aborted NATO deployment into Afghanistan.

The Russian-language service of Deutsche Welle reported on August 26 that a German air force AWACS plane was forced to abort its Afghanistan deployment after three weeks of waiting at a Turkish airbase because of a lack of overflight permission from Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan.

The United States and its European allies have used the Caucasus-Central Asia corridor to resupply their forces in Afghanistan. The route supplements the main supply lines through Pakistan and the recently agreed route via Russia and Central Asia.

Russia, Georgia square off over Black Sea shipping to Abkhazia

Georgia sparked a fresh bout of tensions with Russia after its coast guard boats detained a cargo ship carrying fuel from Turkey to Abkhazia, RFE/RL and other media reported this week.

On September 1 a Georgian court sentenced the Turkish captain of the ship to 24 years in prison on charges of "illegal border crossing" and "smuggling." The ship's operator claimed it was seized at gunpoint in international waters.

In response, Russia pledged to provide naval protection to merchant vessels going to and from Abkhazia to prevent what it called acts of "piracy" by Georgia. And on September 2, the Abkhaz leadership ordered its military to attack Georgian vessels that enter its waters.

Tbilisi considers Abkhazia to be its territory and has detained four other Abkhazia-bound ships in the last year. The Russian-Georgia war fought in August 2008 resulted in the destruction of most of Georgia's naval ships and was followed by Russia's recognition of Abkhazia as an independent country.

Russia has since deployed its forces to guard the de-facto border between Abkhazia and Georgia, and announced plans to build new bases for its air and naval forces in Abkhazia, investing up to $500 million in the new infrastructure.

Armenia-Turkey protocols' announcement and analysis

Armenia and Turkey to sign protocols on relations
But implementation of “roadmap” may be again delayed
by Emil Sanamyan
Published: Tuesday September 01, 2009

President Abdullah Gul of Turkey, left, grabs President Serge Sargsian's hand during their meeting at the EU summit in Prague on May 7, 2009. With them are Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandian, center, and Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu of Turkey, partly obscured on left.

Washington - The protocols "on the establishment of diplomatic relations" and "on the development of bilateral relations" were released on August 31 by the foreign ministries of Armenia, Turkey, and Switzerland, which has served as host to bilateral talks. The release of the documents was quickly welcomed by France, Russia, and the United States.

The protocols are now expected to be formally signed after six weeks of domestic discussion. The timing of the release and the discussion was hardly accidental. The match between Armenian and Turkish national soccer teams is due to take place in Turkey in exactly six weeks.

For his part, Armenia's President Serge Sargsian made his attendance at the match - which would signify continued viability of Armenian-Turkish dialogue - conditional on tangible progress towards Turkey opening its border with Armenia.

But Turkish leaders have explicitly and repeatedly linked such an opening to satisfaction of at least some of Azerbaijan's demands in the Karabakh conflict.

Shortly after the August 31 release, Turkey's foreign minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, told Turkish media that "a longer process is required" for a border opening. Mr. Davutoglu also pledged to "guard" Azerbaijan's interests as part of talks with Armenia, according to an Associated Press citation.

Judging by the published text, establishment of diplomatic relations is also far from imminent. The two protocols would have to take effect simultaneously and only after ratification by the two nations' parliaments. Since the timing for ratification is not spelled out additional delays are possible.

The timing and success of that ratification is likely to depend on how Turkish leaders interpret the course of Karabakh negotiations.

Meanwhile, as in the past Turkey will use reports of "progress" in talks with Armenia to deter the United States and others from recognition of the Armenian Genocide.

Long-delayed announcement

The documents made public this week are believed to have been agreed and initialed by Armenia and Turkey last April, weeks before the April 22 statement that set out the two countries' intentions to normalize relations.

But Armenian officials have since charged Turkey with dragging its feet on moving forward with the agreement.

In an interview published just hours before the release of the protocols, President Sargsian sounded pessimistic about Turkey's intentions.

"[Armenia and Turkey] have agreements," the Armenian leader told the Russian-language service of BBC. "And I think it is quite normal and right for the sides to implement their agreements.

"Regrettably, I have not seen a great desire or willingness [by Turkey] to implement these agreements."

The first indications that some kind of development on Armenia-Turkey track was afoot came on August 28, when Turkish leader Recep Tayyib Erdogan phoned his Azerbaijani opposite Ilham Aliyev to discuss the issue. The next day, Mr. Erdogan dispatched two senior diplomats to detail Turkey's intentions to Mr. Aliyev in person.

And as was reportedly the case with the April 22 statement, the release of the protocols is likely to have come with some American prodding.

According to a report by Turkey's Sabah daily, co-chair of Turkey caucus in U.S. Rep. Robert Wexler (D-Fla.) warned Turkish leaders on August 27 that Congress would likely move on adoption of the Armenian Genocide resolution if Armenia-Turkey dialogue is "hindered."

That warning came a week after Armenia's President discussed talks with Turkey in a phone conversation with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on August 20.

Most controversial points kept out of protocol

While the timeframe for implementation of the agreements remains in doubt, the protocols' content seems to mollify at least some of the key Armenian concerns.

Turkey had long conditioned normalization of relations with Armenia on three issues: mutual recognition of borders, end to Armenian Genocide affirmation campaign and satisfaction of Azerbaijani demands as part of the Karabakh dispute.

Armenian leaders have in turn repeatedly stressed they have no claims on Turkey's territory, have no intention or even ability to end the affirmation campaign and would not make unilateral compromises to Azerbaijan.

In reports earlier this year, Turkish media suggested that Ankara was seeking to have Armenia recognize the 1921 Kars Treaty, signed by Turkey and newly Soviet Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Russia. The Treaty established the existing border and among other things absolved Turkish officials of crimes committed during World War I.

Since 2005 Turkey has also demanded the establishment a so-called commission of historians, acquiescing to which could amount to questioning the veracity of Armenian Genocide.

The protocol on bilateral relations makes no mention of the Kars Treaty or the Karabakh conflict. And it contains only watered-down language on a "sub-commission" that would "implement a dialogue on the historical dimension with the aim to restore mutual confidence between the two nations, including an impartial scientific examination of the historical records and archives to define existing problems and formulate recommendations."

Six other sub-commissions would be set up under an inter-governmental commission to discuss everything from political relations to environment along the lines proposed by former President Robert Kocharian in an April 2005 letter to Prime Minister Erdogan.

If in fact ratified and implemented, the protocols would pave the way for normalization of relations "without pre-conditions" as has been advocated by successive Armenian governments.

Strategy, politics, and opportunism
Themes behind Turkey’s surprise move on Armenia
by Emil Sanamyan
Published: Friday September 04, 2009

Washington - Just days ago the Armenian-Turkish talks appeared at standstill. Even the customarily optimistic American diplomats were calling the process "frozen" and progress "not inevitable." The Economist cited a Western diplomat who said the effort was "on its last legs."

Armenian leaders, initially optimistic about the process, likewise became downbeat.

And Turkish leaders continued to link the establishment of relations with Armenia to a resolution of the Karabakh conflict, widely seen as a much more difficult dispute to resolve.

What then is behind the Turkish government's surprise decision to move ahead with the normalization process?

Three sets of reasons can be suggested.

Strategy

The government of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan – influenced by the ideas of Ahmet Davutoglu, now the foreign minister – has made considerable progress in improving relations with Turkey's neighbors.

If in the past Turkey had problematic relations with nearly all countries adjacent to it, today ties have improved considerably with Greece, Iran, Russia, and Syria, and efforts are underway to engage the government of Iraqi Kurdistan.

Turkish leaders believe that by having good relations with neighbors, Turkey frees itself from constraints that hinder the growth of its influence globally. Ankara has long wanted to evolve from the role of the Western outpost it was in the years of Cold War and the subsequent American policies in the Middle East, or as a conduit for oil and gas transportation to Europe.

So far only Cyprus and Armenia relations remain problematic. If the Turkish occupation of Cyprus blocks Turkey's accession to the European Union, one-sided Turkish support for Azerbaijan in its conflict with Armenia provides an additional irritant to Turkey's relations with Russia, Europe, and the United States.

"There is a status quo in the Caucasus at the moment which is not useful any of the three countries – Armenia, Azerbaijan and Turkey," Mr. Davutoglu told Today's Zaman on September 1. And Turkey will continue to challenge the status quo by engaging Armenia and championing the resolution of the dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan, he added.

But for Turkey the issues of Cyprus and Armenia are eclipsed by the magnitude of problems presented by the country's Kurdish population. As often happens, grand long-term visions can come into conflict with an immediate short-term necessity.

Politics

Nigar Goksel, a Turkish analyst of Armenia, points out that the publication of Armenia-Turkey protocols this October is likely to coincide with parliamentary consideration of the government's "democratization initiative" aimed at expanding rights for Turkey's Kurds.

The measure's critics claim it amounts to an amnesty for members of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), which has been fighting a 30-year guerrilla campaign against the Turkish government. The Turkish political opposition also sees the effort as the ruling party's grab for Kurdish votes.

"It is a tough time for the Turkish government to make an unexpectedly forthcoming step on [Armenia relations] now, given the amount of political capital the Kurdish initiative is using up," Ms. Goksel told the Armenian Reporter.

As part of political bargaining in parliament, it would not be unreasonable to expect Turkish leaders to use the Armenia protocols as a way to deflect opposition from the Kurdish initiative.

Even if the protocols are submitted for ratification, "ultimately there is no guarantee that the protocols will pass parliament," Ms. Goksel said, suggesting a scenario similar to the 2003 parliamentary vote that refused to allow U.S. land forces' transit through Turkish territory in the war against Iraq.

As in the past, the opponents of ratification will likely cite the lack of progress in the Karabakh talks as justifying their opposition, she said. And the government will have other reasons for stalling on the vote.

Opportunism

Some of those other reasons have to do with Turkey's tactic of using the dialogue with Armenia as a shield against international campaigns for recognition of the Armenian Genocide.

The outright recognition of the Genocide by President Barack Obama would be a major blow to the Turkish government's prestige, leaving Mr. Erdogan vulnerable to his political opposition at home.

In the past U.S. leaders have also used the threat of genocide recognition to mobilize Turkish support for America's foreign policy initiatives. By holding talks with Armenia, Turkey is also trying to shield itself from reopening that vulnerability.

The first Armenian-Turkish announcement on the protocols was conveniently made two days before President Obama's first April 24 statement.

President Serge Sargsian's visit to Turkey at the time when Armenia-Turkey protocols are expected to be signed this October would be a good argument for opponents of the congressional resolution on Armenian Genocide.

At the same time, Turkish leaders would probably believe it in their interest to postpone parliamentary consideration of the protocols, citing a lack of progress in the Karabakh talks and a need to get the Kurdish initiative through the parliament first. Ratification could then be re-launched, say closer to the month of April.

And after April 24, 2010, is done with, what can prevent another postponement?

"This kind of delaying would clearly not be transparent conduct [by the Turkish government], if that is in fact the plan," said Ms. Goksel. And while it is hard to guess the plan and predict what the ultimate outcome will be "there are enough reasons to be suspicious."

Congressmen to Obama re: Armenia-Turkey

President Obama is urged to correct course on Armenia-Turkey policy
In letter, 81 members of Congress call on president to recognize Genocide
by Emil Sanamyan

Published: Thursday July 30, 2009

Some of the 81 signatures of members of Congress on a letter to President Obama urging him to separate the normalization of Turkey-Armenia relations from recognition of the Armenian Genocide.

WASHINGTON - The United States should "separate the issues" of the normalization of Armenia-Turkey relations and the recognition of the Armenian Genocide, 81 members of Congress said in July 30 letter to President Barack Obama. The president was urged to uphold his repeated campaign pledges to recognize the Armenian Genocide, while continuing efforts "to nurture the Armenia-Turkey normalization process without preconditions."

The letter was initiated on July 10 by Reps. Frank Pallone (D.-N.J.), Mark Kirk (R.-Ill.), Adam Schiff (D.-Calif.), and George Radanovich (R.-Calif.), who are also the lead co-sponsors of House Resolution 252 affirming U.S. record on the Armenian Genocide. Seventy-seven other members of Congress signed on to the letter in the last three weeks.

Co-signers include Rep. Howard Berman (D.-Calif.), who chairs the House Foreign Affairs Committee, where H. Res. 252 was referred since it was introduced in March.

The congressional recommendation came as Western officials acknowledged that Turkey has not followed through on its April 22 pledge to implement the so-called roadmap toward normalization of relations with Armenia.

"An effort to block"

The members of Congress argued in the letter that Turkey, "in an effort to block U.S. recognition of the Armenian Genocide, agreed to a roadmap it did not intend to uphold."

President Obama failed to use the term genocide in his April 24 remembrance message, referring to efforts to normalize relations between Armenia and Turkey. Congressional leaders have also held up the progress of H. Res. 252 in apparent deference to the president's choice.

Since April Turkish officials have reverted to their policy of conditioning normalization of relations on unilateral Armenian compromises vis-à-vis Turkey and Azerbaijan.

Nevertheless, hosting her Turkish counterpart on June 5, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton provided an upbeat take on Armenia-Turkey relations, suggesting that there has been "no flagging of commitment" by Turkey toward normalization, while also counseling "patience and perseverance."

Process is "frozen"

A few weeks later, however, U.S. ambassador to Armenia Marie Yovanovitch was much less upbeat. In remarks at the Library of Congress on June 30, she acknowledged that while Armenia-Turkey normalization was "possible," it was also "not inevitable."

On July 23, the Economist cited an unnamed Western diplomat, who said Turkey's would-be "rapprochement with Armenia" was "on its last legs."

Even Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Matt Bryza, who is typically optimistic in his public statements, this week described the Armenia-Turkey process as "frozen," Armenian Public Radio reported citing RFE/RL.

But the implications of these developments for a correction in the U.S. course on Armenian Genocide recognition remained unclear.

Citing Secretary Clinton's recent description of Turkey as "an emerging global power," the Economist summarized the expectations with the words of the Western official: "When it comes to Turkey and Armenia, Turkey wins every time."

Text of the letter to the president
July 30, 2009

President Barack Obama
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

We write to you with our concerns about Turkish backpedaling on the agreed upon roadmap to normalize relations between Turkey and Armenia.

On April 22, 2009, just two days before the 94th commemoration of the Armenian Genocide, the Department of State released the following statement:

The United States welcomes the statement made by Armenia and Turkey on normalization of their bilateral relations. It has long been and remains the position of the United States that normalization should take place without preconditions and within a reasonable timeframe. We urge Armenia and Turkey to proceed according to the agreed framework and roadmap. We look forward to working with both governments in support of normalization, and thus promote peace, security and stability in the whole region.

Two days later, instead of recognizing the Armenian Genocide, the Administration opted to focus on this new roadmap to Armenian-Turkish normalization. "I also strongly support the efforts by Turkey and Armenia to normalize their bilateral relations," you wrote. "Under Swiss auspices, the two governments have agreed on a framework and roadmap for normalization. I commend this progress, and urge them to fulfill its promise."

While the Government of Armenia remains committed to this roadmap and has long offered to establish ties with Turkey without preconditions, Turkey's public statements and actions since April 24th stand in sharp contrast to this agreement and undermine U.S. policy that normalization take place without preconditions.

On May 13, 2009, Prime Minister Erdogan publically conditioned normalization of relations with Yerevan on Azerbaijan's approval of a future settlement of the Nagorno Karabagh conflict that fully meets Baku's satisfaction. "I want to repeat once more that until the occupation ends, the border gates [with Armenia] will remain closed," Erdogan told the Azeri Parliament.

On June 17, 2009, EU South Caucasus Envoy Peter Semneby said Turkey had taken "tactical steps backwards" in the normalization process with Armenia.

It would appear that Turkey, in an effort to block U.S. recognition of the Armenian Genocide, agreed to a roadmap it did not intend to uphold. Therefore, we urge your Administration to separate the issues of normalization and genocide recognition. We hope that renewed efforts and focused resources from the Administration can be utilized to nurture the Armenia-Turkey normalization process without preconditions and within a reasonable timeframe, and continue to remain strongly supportive of your stated campaign policy to officially recognize the Armenian Genocide.

Sincerely,

Frank Pallone, Jr. (D.-N.J.)
Mark Steven Kirk (R.-Ill.)
Adam Schiff (D.-Calif.)
George Radanovich (R.-Calif.)
Gary Ackerman (D.-N.Y.)
Joe Baca (D.-Calif.)
Michele Bachmann (R.-Minn.)
Shelley Berkley (D.-Nev.)
Howard Berman (D.-Calif.)
Gus Bilirakis (R.-Fla.)
Bruce Braley (D.-Iowa)
John Campbell (R.-Calif.)
Lois Capps (D.-Calif.)
Michael Capuano (D.-Mass.)
Dennis Cardoza (D.-Calif.)
Jim Costa (D.-Calif.)
Jerry Costello (D.-Ill.)
Joe Courtney (D.-Conn.)
Joseph Crowley (D.-N.Y.)
Peter DeFazio (D.-Ore.)
Steve Driehaus (D.-Ohio)
Anna Eshoo (D.-Calif.)
Chaka Fattah (D.-Pa.)
Bob Filner (D.-Calif.)
Barney Frank (D.-Mass.)
Elton Gallegly (R.-Calif.)
Scott Garrett (R.-N.J.)
Raul Grijalva (D.-Ariz.)
Maurice Hinchey (D.-N.Y.)
Rush Holt (D.-N.J.)
Michael Honda (D.-Calif.)
Jesse Jackson, Jr. (D.-Ill.)
Patrick Kennedy (D.-R.I.)
Dale Kildee (D.-Mich.)
Leonard Lance (R.-N.J.)
James Langevin (D.-R.I.)
Barbara Lee (D.-Calif.)
Sander Levin (D.-Mich.)
Daniel Lipinski (D.-Ill.)
Frank LoBiondo (R.-N.J.)
Daniel Lungren (R.-Calif.)
Stephen Lynch (D.-Calif.)
Carolyn Maloney (D.-N.Y.)
Edward Markey (D.-Mass.)
Betty McCollum (D.-Minn.)
Thaddeus McCotter (R.-Mich.)
James McGovern (D.-Mass.)
Jerry McNerney (D.-Calif.)
Candice Miller (R.-Mich.)
Walt Minnick (D.-Idaho)
Grace Napolitano (D.-Calif.)
Richard Neal (D.-Calif.)
Devin Nunes (R.-Calif.)
John Olver (D.-Mass.)
Donald Payne (D.-N.J.)
Gary Peters (D.-Mich.)
Collin Peterson (D.-Minn.)
Mike Quigley (D.-Ill.)
Peter Roskam (R.-Ill.)
Steven Rothman (D.-N.J.)
Edward Royce (R.-Calif.)
Bobby Rush (D.-Ill.)
Paul Ryan (R.-Wis.)
Loretta Sanchez (D.-Calif.)
John Sarbanes (D.-Md.)
James Sensenbrenner (R.-Wis.)
Brad Sherman (D.-Calif.)
Chris Smith (R.-N.J.)
Mark Souder (R.-Ind.)
Zack Space (D.-Ohio)
Jackie Speier (D.-Calif.)
John Tierney (D.-Mass.)
Dina Titus (D.-Nev.)
Paul Tonko (D.-N.Y.)
Niki Tsongas (D.-Mass.)
Chris Van Hollen (D.-Md.)
Tim Walz (D.-Minn.)
Henry Waxman (D.-Calif.)
Anthony Weiner (D.-N.Y.)
Frank Wolf (R.-Va.)
Lynn Woolsey (D.-Calif.)

"Armenian issue is at core of Turkish identity"

Nigar Goksel discusses Armenia and Turkey
by Emil Sanamyan
Published: Thursday June 25, 2009

Nigar Goksel in Yerevan

Washington - Diba Nigar Goksel is an Istanbul-based senior analyst for the European Stability Initiative (ESI), a Berlin think tank. For the past several years, Ms. Goksel's work has focused on Armenia and has included a report, "Noah's Dove Returns: Armenia, Turkey and the Debate on Genocide," released last April. Last week she was in the United States to begin a research project on the Armenian diaspora's role in Armenia. She was interviewed by the Armenian Reporter's Washington editor Emil Sanamyan on June 17.

Welcomed in Armenia as "normal person"

Armenian Reporter: When you first began working in Armenia, were you apprehensive about it or, perhaps, excited about the opportunity, or both?

Nigar Goksel: I was excited. I was a little bit concerned that as a Turk I wouldn't be spoken to about issues in Armenia openly and that would influence the quality of research I would do.

Like in Georgia and Azerbaijan, our research in Armenia is about trying to understand how Armenia is changing, where Armenia is headed. How the state-building process and economic development, and a debate about the future of Armenia is progressing. A lot of our research in Armenia entailed travel outside of Yerevan, talking to ordinary people, opinion leaders, and business people.

So I was concerned that because I was a Turk, answers would be adjusted accordingly and there would be a perception that I was looking for problems to display [to the outside world] or something like that.

It ended up not being the case and I was positively surprised.

I was received and welcomed wholeheartedly, especially in the villages of Armenia. In Yerevan, it was more complex: some would be more positive, others more negative. And it was in small towns where I received the most challenging questions and borderline accusations.

So it ended up being research / bilateral dialogue effort, because I was also asked a lot of questions by Armenians about Turkey. One amazing thing is how high the level of interest is in Armenia about what is happening in Turkey and how few Turks Armenians actually meet.

AR: The warm reception you describe particularly in the rural areas, did you feel like you were given special treatment because, perhaps, you were breaking existing stereotypes? Or was it more just out of a sense of general neglect and an appreciation of an outsider's attention?

NG: At least in some places, my Turkishness was not important or not initially an important issue. People would talk about their local problems. Say, how budget of this village is sufficient or not for reconstruction of a particular sewage system or whatnot.

And it could be an hour into a conversation when someone would ask where I was from. And upon hearing I was from Turkey, they would say, "Oh, why didn't you tell us?" and start bringing fruits and vodka to the table and start talking about the past.

In part, I think it was a stereotype issue. I was not a classical Turk that people envisioned – a stern man with a mustache. And it was an opportunity for [Armenians] to talk to one of those people that they had heard so much about but never had an opportunity to confront.

Sometimes, when my Turkishness would be first revealed, the conversation would turn more confrontational. [I would be often asked] if from my perspective there was genocide. And after hearing me say yes [there was], and that Turkey is changing profoundly in this sense but that there are still problems- as soon as it seemed that I talked as a normal person, the atmosphere [would relax.]

And in villages, sure, there is a sense of not being paid attention to by other Armenians first of all. So, someone coming from an international organization and caring about what their daily life looked like certainly got a positive reaction.

Rural similarities and differences

AR: You have also done field research in rural parts of Turkey; how similar are problems in Armenia's rural areas to those in Turkey?

NG: There are similarities with Turkey, but frankly problems in Armenia are more similar to Azerbaijan's or Georgia's by virtue of the Soviet heritage and the breakdown of the Soviet system.

In Armenia, in some rural areas, people used to work in industry and had to readjust to working on land, but are still trying to hold on to some degree of their education.

That is different from eastern Turkey where industrialization has not yet reached. And people in Turkish villages were always there and education-wise they are not where the villagers of Armenia are.

And of course in eastern Turkey there is the conflict with the Kurdish insurgency which taps into identity issues and relations with the Turkish state.

Other than that, in terms of underdevelopment, the lack of amenities and limited opportunities, they are similar.

Armenian-Turkish engagement and where it could lead

AR: Having focused on Armenia for several years now, what is your sense of Armenia's main challenges?

NG: When we began working in Armenia, our focus was not on Armenia-Turkey relations. But we soon saw that the debate on the political scene, what politicians are accused of, is usually about concessions they are [ostensibly] ready to make to Turkey. Or the debate on the economy, why Armenia's economy is in a state it is in: Oh, it is because Turkey has closed the border.

So, we realized we could not avoid the Turkey issue if we were to discuss Armenia's challenges. Frankly, I think more and more people realize in Armenia that the source of Armenia's problems today is not necessarily Turkey. Yes, Turkey's border being closed does create some challenges, but were it to open tomorrow it would create other obstacles to recovery of the economy as well.

But Armenia's challenges certainly go beyond the border issue.

AR: On the issue of the border opening: Today, with the border closed, certainly that keeps people apart but not just from cooperating; it also limits conflict. In your sense, would a potential border opening be necessarily a step toward normalization, or just toward a different form of confrontation?

NG: I have thought about this question. Results of the Armenian-Turkish dialogue so far have been positive. Many more Turks come to Armenia, and many more Armenians go to Turkey. That is all very positive and contributes to a positive change in how people perceive each other.

Strong feelings in Armenia

On the other hand, there are issues that we are sweeping under the rug that might come to the surface more should there be [more direct contact via] an open border.

For example, in Turkey there is this perception that diaspora Armenians are the ones who insist on recognition of genocide internationally, and talk about lands and compensation. And that Armenian-Armenians are brotherly neighbors who don't share those views necessarily.

Ironically, this view has been promoted by Turkish liberals, including some liberal columnists, in an attempt [to make the Turkish public] more comfortable about relations with Armenia and so that negative feelings about genocide recognition are not transferred to Armenia in Turkish minds.

But I think there would be a rude awakening when the border does open, and more Turkish nationalists get a chance to meet with Armenians from Armenia, who actually feel quite strongly about genocide recognition.

The Turkish public needs to be ready for that and prepare to hear that.

[Having said all that,] there is really no other way forward, and many Armenians and Turks would have to agree to disagree on certain issues, and that might be the case for some time. And I think if we have some tolerance toward different opinions on both sides, there will be many opportunities to find common ground and similarities.

Many Turks who come to Armenia are astounded at how similar the cuisines, the dances are, the way people look and carry themselves.

Why Turks should care about Armenians

AR: What do you think should or could happen between Armenians and Turks, for them to become nations with historical, but not necessarily present-day problems?

NG: I could speak from the Turkish perspective on this.

Strong political leadership in Turkey is important. A sincere attitude in terms of remorse – I don't know if it is the right word – for the past needs to be emanating from Ankara. And that can be in the form of words, but beyond that having a memorial that is dedicated to the Armenians that were in Anatolia – right now, as you know, we have a memorial to Turks who died in that period.

Definitely, [another thing to do is] owning up to the cultural heritage of Armenians. Having one Holy Cross Church on Aghtamar restored should not be the end. There are other Armenian churches and monasteries that need to be approached with respect and acknowledgement of their Armenianness.

There can be a multitude of steps that could demonstrate a new attitude of Ankara and the past treated with more openness and more regret.

The current government has been inconsistent about its rhetoric on Armenia. There are positive developments, such as more open debate. But on the other hand, while suggesting a historical commission, [Turkish leaders] claim with certainty that there was no genocide. If you are proposing a free and independent study, you can't be making a judgment like that before the study is realized.

AR: Regarding the historical commission, do you see it as purely an element of the public-relations effort – to deflect genocide recognition – or could there be an opportunity there as well?

NG: I don't think [a commission], a state-driven initiative, would change the hearts and minds of Turks and Armenians, nor that it should.

It depends on how it is designed, what its mandate is. I think a commission to facilitate research on this issue can only help, if it is going to involve opening of archives, a meeting of minds, independent scholars from around the world, a platform for discussion that is open and constructive, then fine.

But we have to adjust our expectations. I don't think anybody really expects that [a commission] would work and solve the differences. I think we should be used to different opinions that can come closer together over time, but not necessarily be resolved all together.

I think when there is a critical mass in [Turkish] society leaning in a particular way, the government will follow that lead.

AR: Why should a critical mass of Turks care about Armenia or the Armenian issue?

NG: Because the Armenian issue is a core issue when it comes to Turkish identity, and the state's relationship [with the public]. When you see liberal intellectuals confronting the state in Turkey, the Armenian issue is one of the issues at hand.

It symbolizes the Turkish state's monopoly over history learning for many years. The Armenian issue is not the only issue that the Turkish education system has selectively opposed; there are many others.

As Taner Akcam noted, the issue is not Armenia; the issue is the Turkish state and its relationship with its citizens. And as Turkish society evolves and becomes more democratic, there will be more questions about what else we have been misled about or not allowed to speak of freely.

In the end, what it means to be a Turk is very intertwined with the Armenian issue.

Going from words to deeds

AR: Do you think Turkey will ever come to a point when it would be ready to offer some sort of compensation – financial or even physical – for the Armenian Genocide?

NG: There has been very positive progress in recent years in terms of allowing for a more open debate in Turkey about Ottoman Armenians, giving more space to challenging views. And considerable progress on minority issues in Turkey. On culture, too, there have been important strides forward: restoration of a church in Diyarbakir is now underway, for example, due partly to changes in foundations law recently.

In terms of compensation [pauses]. I don't think there is a way to hold Turkey legally liable in the foreseeable future. Turkey might be interested in making some gestures toward the Armenians who are descendants of Anatolia families. There is a discussion among intellectuals in Turkey as to what kind of gestures these could be. From benefits in acquiring lands to inviting members of the diaspora to help them find their roots, it is a wide range of possibilities.

Would Turkey actually be sitting down to try to determine financial compensation? We have not found legal ground for that. In foreseeable future, I think gestures will be of different nature.

There is, I think, genuine desire in Ankara to right some wrongs of the past, but there is also a risk of moving too fast and generating a political backlash.

Considering the defensive tone that has dominated in Turkey – you just can't go from that [to paying compensation]. More time is needed.

AR: From an Armenian perspective, of course, plenty of time has elapsed – more than 90 years.

NG: Definitely. But if you look at how much Turkey changed on this issue in the last nine years – it is much more than any change that had occurred from 1915 to 2000. Since 2000 there has been dramatic change. So don't look at the last 90 years, look at the last nine years.

Karabakh linkage and purpose of the "road map"

AR: What about the conflict in Karabakh? Do you see Turkey continuing to side with Azerbaijan on that to the degree it has until now, or do you see a debate and possible evolution there?

NG: The Karabakh issue is difficult. Most people in Turkey see a grave injustice committed to detriment of Azeris and that also no one in the world acknowledges that.

For Turks that is seen as "classical" example of Turkish people being wronged by the international community. Believe it or not, there is a complex of victimization psychology in Turkey as well and in that sense [Azerbaijan] is seen as an extension of Turkey.

But the perception of Turkey and Azerbaijan being "ethnic" brethren is stronger than the reality of it.

Secondly, there is also a feeling for many in Ankara that a Karabakh resolution is not that difficult and can even be done this year, and that is where there is a lack of realism.

But if you ask, who in this region has taken land and given it back, it is hard to find example of that. So, there is not a simplified view of Karabakh [in Turkey]; there is not a very good understanding of it.

There is also a fear of "losing" Azerbaijan to Russia, grounded or not. And the sentiment is that there is more vested economic interest of Turkey in Azerbaijan than there could be in Armenia.

Those in the Turkish press who argued that Turkey should take the Azerbaijani side – who are a minority right now – [tend to] engage in very simple economic calculations, comparing populations and energy resources.

AR: So where do you see Turkey going on this issue?

NG: The Turkish prime minister [Recep Tayyip Erdogan] has said over and over again in April and in May that there would be no normalization with Armenia until there is resolution in Karabakh. He said that so many times in so many different environments that it is difficult to conceive that he could do something that would be totally detached.

What he could do is spin some kind of development on Karabakh – that may not necessarily be a major development – as one more important than it really is and say, OK, this justifies a step toward Armenia. And there could be more steps like that, starting with establishment of diplomatic relations.

But it would be politically very difficult to disconnect [Armenia-Turkey relations] from Karabakh.

AR: What was then the purpose of the April 22 declaration by Armenia, Switzerland, and Turkey? Was it just a kind of "cease-fire" agreement to try to preempt "bad" resolutions in foreign parliaments?

NG: Turkey might hope that the "road map" would serve as a disincentive for some countries to pass genocide resolutions. Some people in Turkey might think that that might serve that purpose.

But whoever signs that paper on behalf of Armenia, be it president or foreign minister, does not have the authority to prevent the diaspora in the rest of the world from acting.

So, if that is the intention, then it is not realistic. But I don't think that is the only intention either. I would like to think that there is more to it than that.

Going in circles with Turkey

Lack of preconditions undermines Armenia’s position
by Emil Sanamyan
Published: Friday May 08, 2009

Turkish derwishes whirling. 18th cent. painting.

Washington, - President Serge Sargsian admitted in his April 17 press conference that eight-month-long negotiations with Turkey may not result in a breakthrough after all. At the same time he appeared willing to continue the diplomatic effort until the return World Cup qualifying soccer match between Armenia and Turkey in October.

While President Sargsian said he would only travel to Turkey if the Armenian-Turkish border was open or "about to open," no new decisive circumstances are likely to emerge in the next four months to push Turkey or Armenia to change their policies to allow for headway in talks.

The April 22 statement by Armenian, Swiss and Turkish foreign ministries - which according to the Turkish press came after much lobbying by the U.S. State Department - only codifies this status quo: the parties agreed to continue discussions along several issues in a so far unpublished "road map," but without a clear timeframe and without Turkey dropping its preconditions.

Third failure

President Sargsian's attempt to engage Turkey is likely to end in failure just as those of his two predecessors' did as well.

The administration of President Levon Ter-Petrossian tried to launch a new relationship with Turkey "without preconditions." With the country facing a series of seemingly insurmountable crises, relations with Turkey were seen at the time as almost the only route to salvation.

In the end, Mr. Ter-Petrossian proved unable to either subdue diaspora activism on the Genocide issue or restrain Armenian military success in Karabakh, to be able to satisfy Turkey's demands for normalization of relations. The country survived regardless, and stumbled forward.

Turkey's decision to talk to the administration of President Robert Kocharian came after Armenia caught Turkey's attention by threatening to veto the OSCE summit from taking place in Istanbul in 1999, and in the context of publicity surrounding the 2000 push for an Armenian Genocide resolution in the U.S. House of Representatives.

President Kocharian agreed to talk to Turkey first by indirectly supporting an informal Track II initiative - the Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation Commission (TARC) - and then through direct talks between foreign ministers. But those efforts, also conducted on the basis of no preconditions by Armenia, also brought little progress.

The most recent round of talks - initiated by President Sargsian - came amid the rise of a U.S. administration comprised of known supporters of Armenian Genocide affirmation and as Turkey drew politically close to Armenia's ally Russia.

For now, the only noticeable success of the Sargsian administration in this regard has been procedural: Turkey no longer insists on talking to Armenia in the presence of Azerbaijan and does not consult Azerbaijan on the talks. (This has visibly irritated the easily irritable Azerbaijani leadership.)

The on-again off-again Armenia-Turkey talks have also helped build up some reservoir of mutual respect.

But factors encumbering progress in relations continue to prevail over arguments for change.

After addressing immediate concerns related to Russia's role in the Caucasus and the Obama administration's position on the Armenian Genocide, Turkish leaders have returned to preconditions linking relations with Armenia to unilateral compromises (by Armenia) in bilateral relations and on Karabakh.

Skewed priorities

The fundamental reason Turkey can treat Armenia the way it does is on the surface. Turkey has more than 20 times the population of Armenia, 17 times the territory, and 10 times the armed forces, and can simply afford to ignore Armenia's concerns so long as they are not also raised by great powers.

Additionally, Turkey's priorities appear tangible and clear, Armenia's not so much.

First and foremost, seeking to become one of the world's most important countries, Turkey wants an end to the embarrassing campaign of Armenian Genocide recognition. It is no accident that each new bout of high-level Armenia-Turkey talks follows a new spike in the Genocide affirmation campaign.

Turkey also wants Armenia to surrender any claims, real or financial, that stem from the mass violation of the basic rights of Ottoman Armenians. This is what Soviet Armenia did in the Kars treaty of 1921 but independent Armenia has not embraced.

Finally, though less insistently, Turkey wants Armenia to commit to compromises over the Karabakh conflict that would satisfy Turkey's "co-nationals" in Azerbaijan.

What does Armenia want as part of normalization? Nothing, Armenia has declared repeatedly, "there are no preconditions."

That leaves having diplomatic relations and an open border with Turkey as Armenia's priorities.

But that makes little sense from the point of view of real Armenian concerns and interests with regard to Turkey and in Karabakh. Additionally, such posture undermines Armenia's negotiating position with Turkey.

Why "preconditions" make sense

Diplomatic ties and open borders alone do not imply "normal" or even non-hostile relations. There are countries in the world that share an open border while engaging in a direct confrontation.

At the same time, it would be quite reasonable for Armenia to want Turkey to condemn past violence against Armenians, stop discriminating against Armenians today, and protect the Armenian cultural heritage remaining on Turkey's territory. And it would be reasonable for Armenia to so state as part of a normalization process.

Moreover, a less biased Turkish position on the Karabakh dispute could serve as an indication that Turkey no longer condones genocidal policies against Armenians and is finally ready to accept a viable Armenian state on its border.

It is understandable that such policies will take time for Turkey to warm up to. But with these issues absent from bilateral conversations, talks inevitably shift to what Turkey wants – an end to recognition campaigns and a pledge not to make any Genocide-related claims.

Since an Armenian government can never deliver on these demands, even if it tried, this leaves conversations going around in circles. Even those Turkish officials who genuinely want a normal relationship with Armenia have a hard time justifying a change of policy toward Armenia without Armenia reciprocating in any obvious way.

Arguments that a border opening would be mutually beneficial are not persuasive: Armenia is a small country that can be bypassed at relatively low cost, and the impoverished regions bordering on Armenia carry little weight in Ankara’s decision-making process.

Preconditions have become a dirty term in Armenia’s political lexicon. In fact, they are a common way to outline one’s priorities in any negotiation.

By obfuscating their own priorities, successive Armenian governments have only confused their own public as well as Turkish interlocutors and have not helped advance an already complex diplomatic effort.

Editor’s note: an earlier version of this commentary was published in the April 2009 issue of the Stepanakert-based Analyticon journal. It has been edited and updated to reflect some of the more recent developments.

Ed Djerejian: My 1991 posting to Moscow was blocked by Azeris

This was first published in April 25, 2009 Armenian Reporter.

Edward Djerejian: Armenia’s future depends on good relations with neighbors
Retired Ambassador discusses his life, his book, and recent Armenia developments

A leading expert on U.S. policy in the Middle East, Edward Djerejian served in the State Department from 1962 to 1994, receiving numerous awards and distinctions. His postings included ambassador to Syria (1989–91) and Israel (1994), and he served as Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs (1991–93).

After his retirement from the Foreign Service, Amb. Djerejian became the founding director of the James Baker Institute for Public Policy at Rice University in Houston. He has remained active in international affairs. In 1999 he spearheaded a mediating mission to Armenia and Azerbaijan that helped launch talks between the presidents of the two countries.

In 2003, at the request of the secretary of state, he chaired an Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim World and in 2006 he was a senior policy advisor to a bipartisan Iraq Study Group. His book Danger and Opportunity: An American Ambassador’s Journey through the Middle East was released last September. He spoke with Washington editor Emil Sanamyan on April 17.

A child of refugees and a U.S. ambassador

Armenian Reporter: Looking back at your career, what would you say has been the recipe for your success as an American diplomat?

Edward Djerejian: A great deal of perseverance and hard work, being motivated by serving our country. I think public service is a very worthy endeavor in life. I always felt it was a privilege to represent the United States of America both abroad and in Washington with various foreign governments.

And I also think it is a tribute to our country that the American dream of accepting immigrants from all over the world and assimilating them to our society and giving them equal opportunities to achieve what they wish to achieve is a rather unique model.

In my book, I recounted [telling] my own family story to then President Hafez al Asad when I just began my posting as ambassador to Syria.

“After a brief exchange of pleasantries over Arabic coffee and sweets, Asad noted my Armenian name and asked me about my family origins. I recounted how, as youngsters, my father and mother had escaped the Turkish massacres during the 1915–18 period, when the Young Turk government was pursuing its genocidal policy against Armenians, and how they fled to Syria, where they were given refuge.

“My mother’s father, a police official in the Armenian town of Kharpout, was executed, and her mother succeeded in bringing her and her sisters to Aleppo, in northern Syria, for a short period, then took them to the coastal town of Jbeil (Byblos) in Lebanon, where there was a Danish orphanage for Armenian young girls.

“In his upper teens, my father escaped the ‘Death March’ that forced Armenians to travel on foot from their homes in eastern Turkey to the Syrian Desert town of Deir az-Zor, an ordeal during which hundreds of thousands died” (Danger and Opportunity, pp. 84–85).

Mr. Djerejian’s parents eventually made their way to the United States where they started a family. Edward Djerejian was born in New York City in 1939. And 70 years after his parents came to Syria as refugees, he was nominated to be U.S. ambassador in the same country.

ED: I think this [family story] is symbolic of much of what America is about.

Denied assignments in Ankara and Moscow

AR: While there are equal opportunities in U.S. public service for individuals of various backgrounds, outside the United States ethnic and other biases are still a norm. Did your background ever deny you an opportunity abroad as an ambassador to a particular country or an envoy on a specific issue?

ED: It is true that as a member of a minority group I had to work a little harder in order to compete and if you will make the grade and come up the career ladder. But that is probably true of all ethnic Americans that have to break new ground – you just have to work harder at the beginning to establish yourself.

When I came into the Service in early 1960s, I don’t think there were any ethnic Armenians in the Foreign Service. But I didn’t feel any discrimination per se.

The only assignment denied to me was being assigned to [the U.S. Embassy in] Turkey, because I was an Armenian and the State Department thought that could cause problems with the Turkish government.

Once, I got a call and was asked if I had any objections to being added to a list of potential nominees for ambassador to Turkey. I said absolutely not, but also that I didn’t think it was going to happen.

Also, I was on the list to be ambassador to Russia. And that became a case study of where my nomination did not go through because I was Armenian.

President George Bush-41 and Secretary of State Jim Baker nominated me to be the ambassador to Soviet Union. It was 1991 and that was the time of the break-up of the Soviet Union.

Word came back from the last foreign minister of the USSR, Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, that although the Soviet government would be very pleased with Djerejian being nominated and that there was no ad hominem objection, there was a problem coming from [then still Soviet] Azerbaijan. The Azeris’ objection was that having an Armenian-American could be prejudicial for their interests and therefore the nomination was not forwarded.

And as a result, I was appointed assistant secretary in charge of Middle East policy, and we ended up going to Washington instead of Moscow.

Karabakh mission

AR: How did the February 1999 mission come about with you and
Ambassador Peter Rosenblatt going to Armenia and Azerbaijan?

ED: That was an initiative that I took as director of the Baker Institute, where we have a conflict resolution forum. And we have done track-II projects, including Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli-Syrian tracks, which we continue to do.

At that point the Nagorno-Karabakh issue was quite on the agenda. And I thought we could provide a track-II dimension to the official talks that were on and off. I established a small team, and Amb. Rosenblatt was on the team and served very well. I even had my son Gregory Djerejian serve as a rapporteur for our talks and a couple of other people.

We had the assistance of Robert (Vache) Manoukian, a very wellknown businessman in London, and very involved in Armenian issues. He was going to Armenia at the time in any case and very graciously offered his plane for us to do shuttle diplomacy between Baku and Yerevan, which we did. It would have been near impossible to do the same on commercial planes flying between Baku, Moscow, and Yerevan.

In the end, we were able to narrow some of the issues and present them to the two governments as well as the U.S., the Europeans, and the Turks. I don’t want to exaggerate the importance of what we did, but I think it was useful.

We never went back because the OSCE Minsk Group work picked up since then. But I did a lot of work with the State Department advising both Secretary Madeleine Albright and Secretary Colin Powell on the situation in subsequent years.

There was a terrible missed opportunity in 2001. Secretary Powell called me at one point and said that we have a window where President [George W.] Bush and I can get involved to get the Nagorno-Karabakh negotiations moving forward.

And that was about the time of the meeting [between Armenian and Azerbaijani presidents] in Key West, Florida.

So I called our contacts to urge them to be as positive as possible. What I stressed to them is that it is not often when an American president is ready to focus on Armenian-Azeri relations and Nagorno-Karabakh.

That it was a priceless opportunity to take advantage of. Unfortunately, that opportunity was squandered.

AR: Did President Heydar Aliyev have an issue with you as an Armenian-American mediating?

ED: I don’t think so. I think they were a bit surprised over the initiative I took. And one of the Azeri officials said in Baku that we are very impressed with the fact that not only that you came to Baku and that you also brought your son. These gestures in diplomacy can sometimes be very important.

Talks with Turkey “really hold promise”

AR: What is your sense of negotiations underway today?

ED: As you know the high-level talks between presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan continue. And there these extremely important talks between the governments of Armenia and Turkey, which really hold promise right now. And it is something that I absolutely encourage.

I have been promoting Armenian- Turkish reconciliation for years and working behind the scenes with both sides to encourage this.

And over the last year I have seen some real progress. I met with [Armenian] Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandian in London – that was months ago – and that was the first indication that I got that something serious was afoot.

We had some track-II talks with the Turks and Armenians on reconciliation issues. But now it is really upfront at the highest levels of both governments. And that is really the way to go to deal with the border opening and the genocide issue in a context of enhanced relations between Turkey and Armenia.

AR: How would you assess the skill level of Armenian diplomacy over the past decade and a half? Are there any ups and downs that you could identify?

ED: I have seen the Armenian Foreign Ministry evolve over the years. It needed serious training of its diplomats. It needed serious reorganization and obviously needed to have the full support of whoever was the president of Armenia.

Over the last few years I have seen the improvement in capability of the Armenian Foreign Service. And we had the activism of foreign ministers. We have had two [activist] foreign ministers, Vartan Oskanian and now Nalbandian.

I have to say that there is now professionalism that I had not seen before and the ability to think outside the box and not just play to political constituencies, Armenian or foreign.

Armenia has begun to take a more defining role in foreign policy issues that are really critical to the future of Armenia. Be it with Azerbaijan,Turkey, Russia, the United States, France, or other powers, I think now the Armenians have begun to play their hand much more skillfully and effectively.

I have met both President Serge Sargsian and Minister Nalbandian and I think they understand that Armenia has a lot of assets. Even though it is a small state and relatively weaker in relation to some of its neighbors like Turkey or Russia, Armenia is a state that sits at crossroads.

Armenia is a Christian nation, and should Turkey normalize its relations with Armenia, that would really enhance its chances to enter the European Union.

If peaceful relations are established with Azerbaijan and Turkey, you could see some of the pipelines routed through Armenia as well.

Also, Armenia has a strong relationship with the United States because of the very vibrant and active Armenian-American community. Armenia has been supported by both Democratic and Republican administrations and is deserving of U.S. support.

Armenia does have a lot of problems. It needs to reform internally, build up its economy, get rid of corruption, and make the political experimentation with democracy more real.

But once the strategic alignment around Armenia is improved, particularly vis-à-vis Azerbaijan and Turkey, Armenia can look forward to a bright future.

AR: Say the Turkish and Azerbaijani governments, for whatever reason, decline to establish relations with Armenia. What is the formula for survival in a state of continuing confrontation?

ED: That would be a very serious setback for Armenia and all countries of the region, including Turkey and Azerbaijan. But that would only be one failed effort. Everyone would have to re-assess the situation and see how they could pick up the pieces again.

I don’t see any way forward other than state to state relations between Armenia and Turkey and Armenia and Azerbaijan. If talks fail, we’ll just be wasting time and the populations we can never rule out prospects of another war with Azerbaijan.

But why waste more time, when parameters of a settlement between Armenia and Azerbaijan and between Armenia and Turkey are pretty well defined.

Genocide affirmation

AR: Over the years, many Armenian-Americans must have asked you about what to do to have our government take a clear stand on the Armenian Genocide and send an unambiguous message to Turkey. Why you think that campaign has been unable to achieve its stated goal over the last 30-plus years?

ED: The reasons are geopolitical in terms of U.S. interests in the broader Middle East region. Turkey is a major NATO ally. It is a secular state with majority Muslim population. There are many geopolitical assets that Turkey offers to the United States and therefore every administration, Democratic or Republican, has been hesitant to alienate the Turkish government on the genocide issue.

That has been a clear factor in the reluctance of American presidents and administrations to come out and call it genocide.

We Armenians can be frustrated over the fact that the word is not used specifically. But for years I have been saying that the only way this issue is going to be resolved is through state-to-state relations between Armenia and Turkey.

The issue is not just about the use of the word but about dealing with the genocide issue in a sustainable manner. That is why I am bolstered by the latest news from Armenia.

[Ed. Note: the conversation took place before the April 22 joint statement by Armenia, Switzerland, and Turkey.]