Andranik Migranyan on Armenia, Russia and U.S. An Interview

This was first published in the March 14, 2009 Armenian Reporter

U.S.-Russia agenda and stability of Armenia’s region
An interview with Andranik Migranyan

Andranik Migranyan heads the New York office of the Russian Institute for Democracy and Cooperation. Often described in the West as a “pro-Kremlin pundit” and one of the thinkers behind a more assertive Russian foreign policy, Mr. Migranyan is a professor at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO) of the Russian Foreign Ministry, a member of the state-funded Public Chamber of policy experts, and a board member of the Union of Armenians of Russia.

Since 1975 Mr. Migranyan has been a teaching and research professor at several Moscow universities, and a visiting professor in the United States. He came to prominence in the late 1980s as a vocal critic of Soviet policies. In the 1990s Mr. Migranyan served as a senior foreign policy advisor to the Russian parliament and President Boris Yeltsin. Born in Yerevan in 1949, he graduated from MGIMO and earned a candidate’s degree (Ph.D.) from the Academy of Sciences’ Institute of International Workers’ Movement.

Mr. Migranyan spoke by phone with Washington Editor Emil Sanamyan on February 24.

Armenian Reporter: What are Russia’s priorities for the Caucasus? What does its government want to achieve there?

Andranik Migranyan: Russia is interested in peace and stability in the Caucasus because this is one of the most sensitive areas for Russia. [This is a kind] of a “soft belly” for Russia because Russia’s North Caucasus is not very stable [considering the wars in] Chechnya and Islamic radical movements there.

Russia is interested in cooperation with the European Union, Turkey, the United States, and other interested countries – Iran of course – in bringing stability to the Caucasus.

There are some problems concerning Georgia, but with other countries – including Armenia, Azerbaijan, Iran and Turkey – Russia has good and stable relations.

Watching Armenia-Turkey dialogue

AR: What has been Russia’s reaction to the high-level Armenia- Turkey dialogue over the last six months? Has Russia played any role in this process?

AM: Russia is not directly involved [in the dialogue], but Russia of course is following how these relations are developing. Russia has very good multidimensional relations with both Turkey and Armenia, which is Russia’s strategic partner and a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization. For these reasons, Russia is certainly interested in improvement of relations between these two countries.

AR: In your view, what are Turkey’s intentions in this process? Does its government genuinely seek to normalize relations with Armenia as its officials have stated?

AM: I think at this moment Turkey is closer to a breakthrough in relations [with Armenia] than before. While I was a member of the Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation Commission (TARC), [its Turkish members] Gunduz Aktan, Ilter Turkmen, and others emphasized that there is a linkage between Turkish-Armenian relations and Armenian-Azerbaijani relations. And as far as I know, Turkey is now ready to go forward and not to link these two sets of relations.

This means that without preliminary preconditions Turkey could come to normalization – establishing diplomatic relations and opening the border with – Armenia. This in turn could create favorable conditions for solution of all conflicts and problems inherited from the past.

AR: Why do you think the shift you described occurred?

AM: Turkey is interested in addressing its own problems, first of all. This unsolved problem with Armenia hurts enormously the image of Turkey in Europe and in the United States.

Perhaps they are thinking that the United States under this new administration could recognize the [Armenian] Genocide, imposing additional pressures on Turkey. That is one reason. On the other hand, there is growing sense among Turkish elites that this is an abnormal situation between the two countries and the two nations.

The two are neighbors and there is a need to improve the relations.

No Russian unilateralism in Karabakh

AR: Following the war in Georgia, there was much speculation in Armenia that Russia was pushing for a deal in the Karabakh conflict that would involve the introduction of Russian forces in Karabakh. Do you know if in fact something like that was being considered?

AM: I don’t think this was the aim of Russia. ere are three co-chairs [mediating in the Karabakh conflict] and Russia cannot act unilaterally. I don’t believe any such ideas are circulating in Moscow.

AR: And what was then the purpose of the November declaration between the Russian, Armenian, and Azerbaijani presidents, with Moscow stepping up its role above the two other co-chairs?

AM: That was quite a natural thing for Russia to do, since its government wanted to – especially after the Georgia events – have stability in the region. So it was not something exceptional. A joint declaration of presidents [sought to] formulate the idea that a military solution to the problem was not a good idea.

Just previously we witnessed the terrible events between Georgia and Ossetia. And I think the less-than-favorable outcome for Georgia helped disincline Azerbaijan [from acting in a similar manner].

The fact that Azerbaijan signed the declaration was recognition that no military force could be used to solve the problem. That was a good achievement and it was not
intended to undermine either the United States or France.

AR: Following U.S. and European recognition of Kosovo, there has been Russia’s recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Serbia and Georgia have been forced to live with the respective outcomes. Who do you think will be the first to unilaterally recognize Karabakh – Russia or the West?

AM: In this [Karabakh] process, I think either all sides [France, Russia and the United States] are going to recognize [the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic] or none of them.

AR: Unlike the United States, Russia does not have a direct aid program in Karabakh. Is there any reason why Russia has stayed out of Karabakh more than the United States?

AM: It is not true because Russia is a partner with Armenia, because Russia is doing a lot to [strengthen] Armenia’s economy and military. This is indirectly or even directly creates support for both Armenia and Karabakh. Because although Karabakh is not recognized as part of Armenia, in economic and military sense everybody knows there are no serious barriers between the two.

Under Obama, a stronger emphasis on Russia partnership

AR: The new administration is now putting together its foreign policy, in particular seeking the ways to, in the words of President Obama, “reset” relations with Russia. What changes do you detect in the new administration’s approaches toward Russia and the Caucasus?

AM: Not too many serious changes are visible so far. [The conversation took place prior to the March 6 meeting between Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov – Ed.]

In my op-ed in the Washington Times, I listed some of the ideas on the bilateral agenda. Because President Obama is shifting the center of gravity [of U.S. policy] from Iraq to Afghanistan, Russia and Russia’s allies become more important partners for the United States in terms of supplying its forces there; perhaps more important than many of the NATO allies.

Russia is also a critical partner for the United States on the policy toward Iran and Iran’s nuclear dossier. And Russia could contribute to U.S. efforts to address instability in Pakistan and nonproliferation concerns.

Defense Secretary Robert Gates noted in his recent Foreign Affairs article that while America’s resources are enormous, they are limited when it comes to solving many problems unilaterally. That is why multilateralism will be the new administration’s line, making Russia more important for the United States.

AR: How is the economic crisis changing attitudes in Moscow in terms of foreign policy?

AM: [Russian Premier Vladimir] Putin’s speech in Davos is a good answer to this question. Russia’s position is that this crisis is global and requires multilateral actions to get out of it. No selfish or individual activity could solve the problem.

This is why the G20-type of meeting is the proper way of dealing with these problems. [The G20 is made up of the finance ministers and central bank governors of 19 countries: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America, and the European Union, which is represented by the rotating Council presidency and the European Central Bank. President Obama and other world leaders are expected to attend the G20 summit in London this April -Ed.]

First Russian Institute in America

AR: What is the role of your institute in shaping U.S.-Russia relations?

AM: It is a normal attempt to establish a place where Russians and Americans could come together to discuss different problems and try to better understand each other’s aims and goals.

Our first event last November was a seminar on how relations could improve under the new Obama administration. And on February 15 we had a seminar on problems of democracy, discussing the situation with democratic institutions in the West and rest of the world.

We are planning to study local governance in Russia and the United States and media issues.

We are a nongovernmental organization and this is the first such attempt to have such an entity outside of Russia. We have a branch here in New York and one in Paris.

AR: Why New York and not Washington?

AM: Might be because we have the Embassy in Washington, which is an official place. New York is the place for nongovernmental organizations. New York is a great city that has, in addition to political, a lot of great media, financial, and cultural institutions. This is why we are here. But we are certainly in contact with all major think tanks in Washington.

AR: A couple of years ago, while speaking in Washington, you said that Washington is your favorite city after Moscow and Yerevan. Is that still the case?

AM: Not Washington, New York!

Russia raising its U.S. profile:

Long an outsider to the American political establishment and still often treated with suspicion and hostility, the Russian government recently began to emulate other foreign governments that have long attempted to “buy-in” into the Washington policy-making process.

Last month, the New Republic in an article, “Pravda on the Potomac,” described the evolution of Russia’s public relations efforts.

Since 2004 Russia has regularly invited Western experts to Moscow through the “Valdai Discussion Club” for meetings with senior leaders and visits throughout the country.

In 2005, the Russian government launched the 24-hour English- language Russia Today channel, now available via major satellite and cable providers.

In 2006, for the first time in history, the Russian government paid a leading Washington public relations firm, Ketchum Inc. (which has represented Kodak, IBM, Nokia, and FedEx), to promote its policies.

Most recently, the Institute for Democracy and Cooperation was launched in New York in January 2008.

But some less than sophisticated methods have yet to be phased out.

In a recent Atlantic Monthly article, one Washington journalist described a blatant bribing attempt by Russian Embassy staff in an alleged effort to publish stories favorable to Russia.

At another extreme, the World Russia Forum, an annual conference intended to broadcast the importance of Russia for the United States, has a “quota” system that limits media access.

Russian arms transfer to Armenia alleged (or "Командкещи подарил акаСии")

Azeri complaints about Russian support for Armenia appear to be back in vogue - this may be another sign we have in fact cleared the post-9/11/01-period and are now in post-8/8/08 period that as far as Caucasus is concerned is more like the post-1991 and pre-2001 period of Russian regional military hegemony (and low oil prices!).

On January 8, MediaForum.az uploaded what looks like a two-page secret unsigned undated attachment on the letterhead of a Russian general – Viacheslav Golovchenko, deputy commander of the Russian forces in the Caucasus - that lists the types of weapons allegedly transferred from Russian base in Armenia to Armenian defense ministry.

The alleged document (in Russian below) contains a couple of grammatical errors and typos: specifically the words АкаЦия and Командующий are misspelled. This may be either because the alleged document is a forgery or just a legitimate scanning error.

UPDATE from a colleague: Two more typos found "катИгория" instead of "категория," and "гранатАмет" instead of "гранатомет." This makes it look more like a forgery.

The document lists as transferred: 21 tanks; 61 armored combat vehicles; 50 units of self-propelled and towed artillery; 9 MLRS systems; various air defense systems; light weapons; ammunition stockpiles; and equipment.

Nothing extraordinary and in relatively modest amount especially compared to massive acquisitions advertised by Azerbaijan in recent years.

If it is a real document, it most likely ended up in Azerbaijan as a result of being handed over by the Russian Defense Minister Anatoly Serdiukov who was in Baku in December for annual talks on bilateral defense cooperation.

Earlier in 2008, Russia reported to the United Nations that it transferred dozens of tanks and armored vehicles to Azerbaijan.

If it in fact occurred, this Russia to Armenia transfer may have been in part to offset deliveries to Azerbaijan.

But unlike their Armenian colleagues, Azeri media is seeking to make this into a big story having promptly converted the equipment list to an inflated dollar figure presumably for easy use in a PR campaign in the West (in a manner similar to the "1 billion dollar" campaign of the 1990s).

Members of the Azeri ruling clique have internalized the transfer as fact and branded it as a "scandal," "illegal," "sign of aggression" and "unfair."

Azeris to run Georgia gas network

First published in November 22, 2008 Armenian Reporter

Georgia cedes its natural gas network to Azerbaijan
by Emil Sanamyan

The Iran-Armenia gas pipeline at Saralanj. Photolure

Washington, - Georgia agreed to hand over the ownership of its natural gas network, which includes the transit gas pipeline from Russia to Armenia, to the Azerbaijani government, news agencies reported.

Under the November 14 deal, announced by Georgian leader Mikheil Saakashvili the next day, in return Azerbaijan would satisfy the bulk of Georgia's natural gas needs in 2009-13 at below-market prices.

The deal was finalized during an energy summit in Baku that brought together a number of central and eastern European heads and senior officials of states interested in Caspian energy.

Also at the summit, Kazakhstan agreed to expand its oil shipments via Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline built with U.S. support.

"Property for debt"

Georgia's deal with Azerbaijan is similar to Armenia's deal with Russia, exchanging formal ownership of the gas network - that could potentially serve as political leverage - for a temporary reprieve in prices.

Until this year, like Armenia, Georgia bought most of its natural gas from Russia. Moscow reportedly came close to buying the Georgian gas network, but the offer was declined by Tbilisi on the U.S. government's insistence, which was concerned with integrity of non-Russian gas supplies.

Although the Georgian-Russian border is closed and official relations are suspended, Russia continues to supply Georgia, and through it Armenia, with natural gas. The biggest gas consumers in Georgia - the Tbilisi electricity network and a chemical plant - are owned by Russian companies.

While Russian-Georgian talks on South Ossetia and Abkhazia resume in Geneva this week, no normalization in relations is anticipated any time soon.

Speaking at the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington on November 15, President Dmitry Medvedev said that Russia was "ready to build relations with Georgia."

"But not with the current [Saakashvili] regime," Mr. Medvedev said. "That is a red line, which we cannot cross."

Armenia impact

Azerbaijan has now promised to cover more than 60 percent of Georgia's overall gas needs - estimated at 1.8 billion cubic meters of gas a year - at below-market prices. The rest of the supplies to Georgia would still need to come at market prices from Azerbaijan, Russia, or Iran.

Armenia imported more than 2 billion cubic meters of gas from Russia last year. In addition to the now Azerbaijani-owned Georgian transit pipeline, Armenia can now potentially import natural gas from Iran - an important safeguard that Armenia rushed to complete in recent years - should new problems arise in supplies via Georgia. The Iran option also becomes more attractive as Russia begins to raise prices for its supplies starting next year.

Consequences for Armenia of the Georgia deal may become apparent soon. Azerbaijan and Turkey had previously used a promise of lower gas prices to Georgia as leverage against Armenia in the form of Georgian support for the Kars-Akhalkalaki rail bypass and other projects.

The Russian-Georgian war already disrupted air and other traffic between Russia and Armenia. Media reports suggested that Georgia was trying to prevent Russian military cargo, including those resupplying its military base in Gyumri, from reaching Armenia.

Considering the continued importance of Georgia transit to Armenia, it is not surprising that both President Serge Sargsian and Defense Minister Seyran Ohanian have visited Georgia since the August war, and Prime Minister Tigran Sarkisian is expected to go soon.

See my Jan. 2007 analysis of the same subject here:
http://yandunts.blogspot.com/2007/02/published-in-janury-13-2007-issue-of.html

Interview with Amb. Gilmore: U.S. will not allow a Russian sphere of influence

Ambassador Harry Gilmore: The United States will oppose a Russian sphere of influence
by Emil Sanamyan and Lusine Sarkisyan

Amb. Gilmore in his Virginia home. Armenian Reporter.

Harry Gilmore, former U.S. ambassador to Armenia (1993-95) spoke with the Armenian Reporter's Emil Sanamyan and Lusine Sarkisyan on September 16 about ongoing U.S.-Russian tension over Georgia and its implications, Turkey's position on the matter, and Armenia's latest effort to normalize relations with Turkey. Below are edited portions of that conversation.

Reporter: It seems like the Russian government is itching for some kind of a tussle with the United States. In addition to the Georgia operations, last week you saw Russia sending strategic bombers to Venezuela, and now it's sending its navy to the Caribbean.

Gilmore: Russia is being consciously more assertive. The analysis that I've seen from the people I trust most in terms of understanding Russia, from ambassadors to Russia there have been a stream of events that [aim to] defeat Russia's frustration.

I think historically Russia has a frustration of being encircled by the West and the outside world and not being a part of Western European institutions more broadly.

They particularly like to quote Winston Churchill, who at one point in the early days of the Soviet Union said he wanted to strangle the baby of Bolshevism in its cradle. I think even though the Communist period is over, the Cold War is over, I think that's still one part of Russian mentality and I think a number of events have fueled the Russian frustration about being a part of what they call the unipolar world and the desire to break out of that.

[That list of grievances includes most recently] the independence of Kosovo. [Russians] think about that as unjust action on the part of the West, and they felt that it set an unfortunate precedent; NATO expansion [into former Warsaw Pact and Soviet republics, even though] Russians felt there was an understanding that the NATO will not move eastward, particularly militarily.

They feel Russia has been taken advantage of and another aspect is the missile defense effort of the U.S. - an effort to defend against Iranian missile capabilities, but it was Poland and the Czech Republic that really bothered Russia.

I think all these things are part of the mindset, part of this clash in Georgia.

[At the same time,] I think we have a financial meltdown, a global financial crisis. Let's just say I think it's beyond the control of any one government and I think it's going to have a major impact on all of us.

What I hope is that it plays out that we all keep each other's interests in mind and Russia doesn't come off poorly, Russia doesn't suffer more.

I would like to see Russia come out of this with a deeper understanding of its connections with the global economy and need to be careful when you are such an important economic player with even brighter economic future.

Turkey and the Russia-Georgia war

Reporter: One of the striking developments last month was the Turkish government's position. On the day of Russians coming into Georgia, Turkish president Abdullah Gül was hosting the Iranian president, and talked to the Guardian about this Georgian situation being a lesson to the U.S. that it's not a unipolar situation any more, that it's a multipolar world now.

Considering this position, would it be valid to say that the U.S.-Turkish alliance no longer exists and that NATO membership no longer matters that much?

Gilmore: I don't think it's quite that traumatic, but certainly NATO has changed greatly: it's bigger, and the original core members of NATO now are only one piece of NATO. But I don't think NATO is out of business by any means.

The influence of NATO with regard to Georgia and Ukraine is something we need to watch very carefully because the question is will there be a consensus in NATO on whether to offer Georgia and Ukraine closer ties with NATO. I think that NATO has not gotten a consensus on that.

Reporter: Definitely not, but in terms of Turkey: In recent years, Turkey would typically be positioned somewhere between the U.S. and continental Europe, which has been skeptical about enlargement and confronting Russia. That would be a typical Turkish position. In this conflict, it seems that the Turkish position was much closer to Russia than any other NATO country; there was no Turkish criticism of Russia at all.

Gilmore: I'm not sure of that, I've watched that carefully and I'd put that out there as a question mark, an assertion to be explored. Has Turkey reacted differently, has Turkey been more understanding toward the Russian position?

I think Turks had given Georgians some assistance. The Turks are obviously very careful with Russia and the U.S. When U.S. [vessels] carried assistance up through the straits to the Black Sea, the Turks applied convention rules very carefully and didn't change these requirements, and the Russians, by the way, appreciated that.

With that being said, I have seen nothing since August 8 that suggests that Turks had changed their course on EU membership or changed any of their loyalty to NATO. Given the special nature of Turkey, the Turkish government will always be careful and any change in Turkish policy would be very subtle thing.

Turkish-Armenian summit

Reporter: Since we are on subject of Turkey, the Turkish president's visit to Armenia was one of those not-so-subtle events. Our journalists in Armenia had dug up information that previously Turkish Prime Minister Ismet Inönü visited Soviet Armenia in the 1930s.

Gilmore: In a way it doesn't surprise me. When the Soviet Union was born, there was an alliance between Russia and Turkey. Vladimir Lenin personally was one of the authors of it. That memory is not dead and for a person like Inönü, who was a close lieutenant [of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's] that would be something that he was a part of.

Reporter: Clearly, President Gül did put a lot of thinking into this decision...

Gilmore: As did, I think, President Serge Sargsian....

Reporter: One would imagine, but the invitation was extended two months ago and for those two months there was no clear response from President Gül....

Gilmore: The Turkish press gave significant coverage to the invitation and President Sargsian was interviewed [by the Radikal newspaper] and I thought did a masterful job in presenting the case why he invited President Gül.

It's not the first time Turkish reporters are given interviews by Armenian leaders. Robert Kocharian gave a very important interview, 5-6 years ago. Of course, in my time, Levon Ter-Petrossian was engaged in a careful dialogue with Turkey.

But it seems to me that President Sargsian has done a very masterful job in trying to explain to the Armenian world why he's doing what he is doing. He is in it with his eyes open. I think it's a major initiative for the Armenian leader and I hope it bears fruit.

Reporter: Can this clear the waters in terms of Armenia explaining its position to Turkey, rather than Turkey explaining the Armenian position to itself, as it has been for a while? Do you think the Turkish leadership is clear about what Armenian intentions are?

Gilmore: I think they are. From what I've seen, there has been dialogue since the rebirth of the Armenian state; there has been some dialogue between Ter-Petrossian and Turkish leaders.

But I think there is more dialogue now between Armenia and Turkey than ever before.

Reporter: One functional difference is that for Armenia, the Turkish issue is large, an almost definitive issue in its foreign policy, but for Turkey Armenia is one of many issues on its agenda.

Turkey is now focused on winning a seat on the UN Security Council. They are opening embassies around Africa and assisting Pacific island nations, thus generating international support. They are still on the EU track but it is not as significant as previously.

How is the Armenian item playing into larger Turkish policy today? Is Turkey genuinely interested in normalization?

Gilmore: I think they are, one of the reasons I'm sure that the Turks have calculated carefully. Azerbaijan for its own reasons has been very nervous about [Russian recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia], about the Turkish-Armenian dialogue.

They have lobbied Ankara against it but this time, Gul and [Prime Minister Recep Tayyip] Erdogan [must have] have thought through of what they are doing about Armenia and talked to Baku about it and made it clear that whatever Baku [says,] the Turks are going.

That to me is a measure of Turks' sincerity.

Pipelines and Karabakh after the Ossetia war

Reporter: It seems until recently the Turks weighed Baku and Yerevan and said: why should we spoil good relations with "brothers" in Baku at the expense of Yerevan, which is not offering us that much other than some soothing historical lessons?

Now, with Turkish position evolving with Russia, they look at Armenia as an extension of Russian interests and....

Gilmore: They certainly look at Armenia as a strategic ally of Russia, which President Sargsian has made very plain is the case, and then the Turks have taken that into account.

With that being said, I give Turkish diplomacy a lot of credit and I think they will see Armenia as a strategic ally of Russia is not in lock-step to Russia. Armenia is a sovereign country and Sargsian is making decisions as the head of sovereign Armenia. Strategic alliance with Russia is fundamental to Armenian interests as he and the Armenian political class see them, but Armenia is not anybody's satellite.

Reporter: But would it make sense to say that now Turks are not just weighing Baku against Yerevan but they are weighing the future of their relations with Russia and Armenia versus Baku?

Gilmore: I think it's probably a factor in their decision. I think the Turks also know if there is an opening of a new border and exchange of ambassadors it could be very significant.

If you could get Armenian-Turkish normalization and some kind of agreement on Karabakh I think you could have a very different Caucasus. I think Armenia and Azerbaijan have naturally a lot of complementarities in terms of economics and I think both countries would profit considerably and quickly. I'm sure the Turks have thought of that and I'm sure they've thought of communications with Baku which are now through Georgia or down the tortured route through Iran.

Reporter: From your time, there was a lot of talk about running the Azerbaijan to Turkey pipelines through Armenia. It seems that because of the crisis in Georgia that talk has been revived. A sign of that was Vice President Dick Cheney, while not going to Armenia, making a comment on inviting Armenia to the EU summit on energy.

Gilmore: I saw that and again, Armenia will be very careful on this issue because of its strategic alliance with Russia. So much depends on Russia's intentions.

[But] I think it's clear that the Turks have been very careful not to rule anything out in terms of Armenia as a transit country of future pipelines. It's probably premature to talk about it at this point but I cannot believe the Turks, careful strategic thinkers, haven't thought about it.

Reporter: Other than that, in terms of the U.S. reaction to this crisis, one of the side effects that we have seen is [Deputy Assistant Secretary of State] Matt Bryza drafting new language on the U.S. position on Nagorno-Karabakh for Vice President Cheney's visit to Azerbaijan; he played up "territorial integrity," and it was clearly designed to appease Azerbaijan.

Gilmore: I've also seen the U.S. ambassador to Azerbaijan in the Azerbaijani press saying it's time to put more emphasis on resolving the issue in the context of Azerbaijan's territorial integrity. I don't know if it's a policy shift or not.

Reporter: And for our readers, what is the difference between a change of rhetoric and a change of policy?

Gilmore: Change in rhetoric does not necessarily mean change in policy. From what I understood from colleagues in the U.S. government, the U.S. still hopes to work on [the Madrid] principles for Karabakh. [The say that] France, the U.S., and Russia [can continue] as co-chairs of the Minsk Group.

The other question on my mind as a former diplomat is about the French, through President [Nicolas] Sarkozy's mediation efforts in Georgia: Are they looking at this post-August 8? Is there any implication for Karabakh negotiations and what is it? What are implications of Russia recognizing South Ossetia and Abkhazia? Is there an analogy with the Karabakh?

McCain vs. Obama Russia policy

Gilmore: Maybe there will be difference depending on which candidate will be elected in terms of a difference in policy. Sen. John McCain at one point said that we are all Georgians; whether in fact a McCain administration will pursue that policy, I'm not sure.

I would assume whichever camp wins there would be systematic review of U.S. policy, including toward Russia and the region. I would imagine if McCain gets elected, the idea of Georgia being supported for eventual NATO membership would still be U.S. policy.

With Barack Obama, I'm less sure [he'd support such a direct confrontation with Russia], but support for Georgia's territorial integrity will be a part of our policy whoever is elected. And then I think at some point Russia intends to incorporate [Abkhazia and South Ossetia]. This could be a long procedure.

Reporter: Either way, the holdup there is Abkhazia. It doesn't want to be a part of Russia.

Gilmore: [True,] Russians were not totally pleased with the outcome of the [most recent presidential] election there and the Abkhaz have the tendency to do their own thing. Ossetia is different; North Ossetia is a part of the Russian Federation so South Ossetia joining that entity is logical from South Ossetian and Russian points of view.

Reporter: What do you think is in the U.S. interest? Should the United States continue to lobby for Georgia and Ukraine to be NATO members and thus antagonize Russia? Or should the United States in a way let this area be like Finland in the Cold War - connected to the West economically but not militarily?

Gilmore: I would say certainly the U.S. interest is to continue support of the territorial integrity of Georgia as well as the territorial integrity of Moldova...

Reporter: And, in that case, what about Azerbaijan?

Gilmore: In Azerbaijan: support its territorial integrity, but the territorial integrity and principles are fine, but there is a negotiated settlement that changes that and the parties agree that's a different question. I think I made myself clear and I know you understand it.

But, back to the U.S., I would personally support economic assistance to Georgia and figure out a way to repair some infrastructural damage. If Georgia continues to pursue NATO membership I think the U.S. [should support that]. That's what Assistant Secretary of State Dan Fried had said in his last testimony; I think it's going to be U.S. policy.

And some kind of [security] assistance to Georgia to enable it to have the means to protect its own internal security and putting down some kind of protections for its borders [is in order].

Reporter: But back to Finland. It was attacked by the Soviet Union in 1939 and the U.S. and allies sacrificed Finland's interests to keep the Soviet Union as an ally against Nazi Germany. So, in this case, the bigger challenge is Iran or Islamic terrorism or perhaps China; would it make sense for the U.S. and its allies to sacrifice Georgia's interests to continue to court Russia?

Gilmore: I don't think we'll do that. The United States and European Union are not going to abandon Georgia. However, whether they will approve Georgia for full membership in NATO is a different question. It's a question of when and if.

Reporter: Finally, with the financial collapse going on, would it be too conspiratorial to suggest that some thinking minds in the United States and Russia could decide that some kind of long-term confrontation might be in the interests of their states?

Gilmore: I think no, the decision makers in both countries are very careful not to get into that kind of a situation. There is nothing to be gained for either side in that kind of confrontation. Everybody would lose and people in the countries would just suffer.

I personally don't look for a new Cold War, I see some analogies, but I don't know if this is becoming a Cold War.

With that being said, I think there is a possibility that Russia by pushing the idea that it has a sphere of influence will get a negative reaction in the political class of the U.S.

I think nobody is going to accept that as when we talk about the sphere of influence, does that mean Poland shouldn't be in NATO? We won't accept that and if the Russians keep talking about it, it will change the attitude of not only the U.S. but France and Britain, maybe even Germany.

I hope the Russians don't go down that road and they calculate their interests carefully.

Briefly: Russian displeasure on U.S.-Armenia nuclear proposal, Fried on Karabakh, GUAM issues a new draft resolution, Dink honored in Austria

This was originally published in December 15, 2007 Armenian Reporter.

by Emil Sanamyan

Russia displeased with U.S. role in Armenia’s nuclear energy plans
Russia’s former minister of nuclear energy Viktor Mikhailov expressed hope that “Armenia would accept Russia’s proposal and decline U.S. assistance” in the effort to build a new nuclear power plant, the Regnum news agency reported on December 6.

On November 21, the United States agreed to fund a $2 million feasibility study that would help determine the best technical solutions to replacing the aging reactor at the Metsamor power plant with a new nuclear energy-generating capacity. (See the story on page A1 of the November 24 Armenian Reporter.)

Armenia’s government has made building a new nuclear energy plant in the next several years a top priority and has reached out to the United States as well as Russia and other states for potential assistance.

Russia was first to react positively. During a visit to Armenia last April, Russian nuclear energy director Sergei Kirienko offered assistance with both construction and funding for the new plant, which is estimated to cost up to $2 billion. Since then U.S. officials have also expressed interest, resulting in the feasibility agreement.

Speaking on November 29, Armenia’s energy minister, Armen Movsisian, expressed confidence that several countries would be ultimately involved in the project.

Mr. Mikhailov, who currently holds a senior position at the Russian Federal Nuclear Center, was the nuclear energy minister at the time when Russia assisted Armenia in reactivating the Metsamor plant in the mid-1990s.

“When someone is playing a double game, it is difficult to make predictions,” Mr. Mikhailov said, but expressed hope that Armenia would stick with Russia on nuclear energy. He agreed with a suggestion that U.S. assistance was part of an effort to “strengthen political influence in Armenia.”


Senior U.S. diplomat takes issue with Azerbaijani policies, urges deal on Karabakh
“It is time to wrap up agreement on the Basic Principles of a Nagorno Karabakh settlement,” said U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Dan Fried speaking at an Azerbaijani-government organized conference in Washington on December 10.

Mr. Fried was referring to the joint proposal made by U.S., Russian, and French diplomats during the November 28 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) meeting in Madrid. (See this page in the December 1 and 8 Armenian Reporter.)

Speaking at that meeting, Armenia’s Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian, broadly welcomed the proposal. Azerbaijani officials did not react immediately with President Ilham Aliyev taking a two-week vacation. On December 10, they requested additional time to study it, local media reported.

“The South Caucasus cannot achieve its full potential in the absence of a Nagorno-Karabakh settlement,” Mr. Fried said, according to a transcript released by the State Department. “As long as Armenia remains isolated in its region, a common vision of prosperity and freedom, and therefore stability, will not be attainable.”

Speaking with regional journalists last April, Mr. Fried addressed Azerbaijani military threats against Armenians, warning that “war will destroy everything Azerbaijan is trying to do.”

This week, the State Department official was also blunt about the continued crackdown on dissent in Azerbaijan, saying that the United States was “deeply disturbed” by it. Mr. Fried referred to Azerbaijan’s growing oil revenues and urged democratization, arguing that “sudden wealth unchecked by strong, honest institutions to handle it can fatten a small group of well-placed leaders rather than strengthen a nation.”

The conference on “The Azerbaijan-Turkey-U.S. Relationship,” which Mr. Fried addressed, continued in Los Angeles on December 13. According to the Azerbaijani consulate there, in addition to Azerbaijani and Turkish speakers, it also featured Beverly Hills, Calif., mayor Jimmy Jamshid Delshad.

GUAM states introduce a new UN draft resolution on post-Soviet conflicts
The governments of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova (GUAM) have again requested that the United National General Assembly express support for Soviet-era administrative borders as the basis for their territorial integrity.

The four-state grouping formally introduced the draft on December 4. The draft resolution’s text refers to Nagorno-Karabakh as a “region of the Republic of Azerbaijan” and calls for “support to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and the Republic of Moldova and the inviolability of their internationally recognized borders.”

It is so far unclear when and if the UN General Assembly may consider the draft resolution. GUAM states had introduced a similar resolution last year, but then withdrew it prior to a vote being scheduled. (See this page in September 8 and November 3 Armenian Reporter.)

Unlike UN Security Council resolutions, those by the UN General Assembly are nonbinding, but they carry symbolic and political significance.

Armenia has already expressed its opposition to the most recent proposal. Speaking on November 28, Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian noted Azerbaijan’s “active and aggressive search for alternative international forums in which to present their case” among the factors that undermine the peace process.

Foreign Ministry spokesperson Vladimir Karapetian told Regnum news agency on December 10 that Armenia will work to prevent the proposal’s passage.


Late Hrant Dink recognized as “World Press Freedom Hero”
The Vienna-based International Press Institute (IPI) – a network of journalists, editors, and others who work in the media – this week honored Hrant Dink, the Turkish-Armenian editor who was killed in Istanbul last January, as one of its World Press Freedom Heroes.

The award was presented to Mrs. Rakel Dink on December 10. Mr. Dink worked to improve Turkish-Armenian relations and opposed the Turkish government’s censorship of topics such as the Armenian Genocide and continued discrimination against the remaining members of the Armenian community. (http://www.freemedia.at)


Minority Rights Group issues new report on Turkey
Also this week, the Minority Rights Group International, a Britain-based charity, issued a report that highlighted the Turkish government’s continued repression of minority groups.

The report “A Quest for Equality: Minorities in Turkey” noted that “instead of celebrating diversity, the history of the Republic of Turkey is one of severe and sometimes violent repression of minorities in the name of nationalism.”
(www.minorityrights.org)

Nareg Seferian contributed to this week’s column.

Briefly: “Genocide Prevention Task Force” launched, ICG warns of war in Karabakh, AIPAC visits Azerbaijan

This was originally published in November 17, 2007 Armenian Reporter.
by Emil Sanamyan

Former administration officials face credibility questions as they launch anti-genocide effort
Former Secretaries of State and Defense Madeleine Albright and William Cohen this week announced the formation of the “Genocide prevention task force,” which they will co-chair. But while launching the effort at a press conference at the National Press Club on November 13, they repeatedly heard questions, including from the Armenian Reporter, about their credibility on the issue.

In addition to working against Armenian Genocide affirmation while in government, last September both Ms. Albright and Mr.Cohen co-signed letters opposing House Resolution 106, which affirms the U.S. record on the Armenian Genocide. The former defense secretary’s lobby shop, the Cohen Group, maintains a “strategic alliance” with DLA Piper, one of the major lobbyists for the Turkish government.

Asked if their opposition to Armenian Genocide affirmation meant that the U.S. “shouldn’t be taking action on future genocides because of what it could mean to U.S. interests,” the former secretaries appeared to agree.

“There are no absolutes in this,” said Mr. Cohen. “There is an element of pragmatism... I think anyone serving in public office necessarily has to have a set of balancing factors to take into account.” In a follow-up comment one of the journalists noted: “It sounds as if both of you are saying that ‘if our friends do it, it’s not genocide, if our enemies do it, it is genocide.’”

“Secretaries Albright and Cohen can’t have it both ways,” argued the Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA) executive director Aram Hamparian. “Either they stand unconditionally against all genocides all the time, or, by choosing to only raise their voices when it’s convenient, they surrender their moral standing on this, the core human rights and humanitarian issue of our time.”

The Albright-Cohen “task force,” established jointly by the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum, the American Academy of Diplomacy, and the U.S. Institute of Peace, “will generate practical recommendations to enhance the U.S. government’s capacity to respond to emerging threats of genocide and mass atrocities” in a report scheduled for release in December 2008.

Connect at http://www.ushmm.org/conscience/taskforce/press/?content=2007-11-13


Think tank warns of increased risk of war in Karabakh by 2012
The International Crisis Group (ICG), a Brussels-based think tank this week renewed its call on Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders to make progress toward a peaceful settlement of the Karabakh conflict, although admitting that “the oil boom and extensive military development in Azerbaijan and steady economic growth in Armenia suggest that neither will feel compelled to compromise.”

In its “Nagorno Karabakh: Risking War” report issued on November 14, ICG said that the international community should do more to prevent a potential military escalation. Its analysts concluded that while an “all-out war” was unlikely in the near future, the risk of war “may reach a new level around 2012, however, when Azerbaijan’s oil revenues are expected to begin to decline.”

“At that point, Baku might be tempted to conclude that the balance of power was at its most favorable and that an appeal to extreme nationalism could counteract popular disenchantment with the regime. Before this happens, the international community needs to lose its complacency and lobby with all available pressure for peace.”

The peace formula currently on the table involves withdrawal of Armenian forces from around Karabakh, with “special modalities for Lachin and Kelbajar,” and parties agreeing that Karabakh’s status should be finalized through a new referendum. ICG suggested that parties should endorse basic principles of settlement, while also noting their disagreements, as soon as possible.

ICG is co-chaired by retired former senior British and U.S. officials Chris Patten and Thomas Pickering and led by former Australian foreign minister Gareth Evans. Its previous report on “Nagorno Karabakh: Plan for Peace” issued in October 2005 also warned that increased defense spending and war rhetoric were “ominous signs that time for a peace agreement is running out.”

Connect at http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5157&l=1
See also the Armenian Reporter’s editorial on page A10.


Members of U.S. Israeli lobby visit Azerbaijan
American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) National Board member Ron Barness led the organization’s delegation on a visit to Azerbaijan, which included a meeting with President Ilham Aliyev on November 9, the latter’s press office reported the same day.

In the meeting Mr. Barness reportedly “stressed existence of tolerance and attention to the representatives of different confessions, including representatives of the Jewish community, in Azerbaijan.”

Israeli ambassador to Azerbaijan Artur Lenk told the Trend news agency on October 25 that the group intended to visit to Azerbaijan, as well as Turkey, to promote these countries’ relations with the U.S. and Israel, and that “after the visit to the region the issue will be raised at the U.S. Congress.”

There have been no public reports about the AIPAC group’s trip to Turkey.


Armenia declines to join another Russian demarche at OSCE
Russia along with Belarus, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan suggested more restrictive guidelines for registration of nongovernmental organizations at the Vienna-based Organizations for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Washington-based Freedom House reported on November 6.

The initiative is unlikely to be endorsed by the OSCE, which operates on a consensus basis, but Moscow has used such proposals to gain leverage for concessions on other issues of interest.

Armenia, which joined an earlier proposal by Russia to curtail OSCE election monitoring (see Tatul Hakobyan’s report and analysis in the November 10 Armenian Reporter), declined to endorse the latest effort.

According to a source familiar with OSCE proceedings, the Armenian government resisted Russian lobbying because it has generally good relations with Armenian NGOs. After Armenia pulled out from the initiative, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyz Republic followed suit.

Nareg Seferian contributed to this week’s column.